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The purpose of this study was to determine the most
appropriate and effective manner in which to provide feed-
back to the unit commander after a Marine Corps Combat Readi-
ness Evaluation System (MCCRES) . To this end research was
conducted into the areas of management control and evaluation
theory
.
The approach of the study was multi-disciplinary with a
detailed emphasis on the economic question of how better
distribution could be made of the scarce resources of man-
power, equipment, and training time based on the results of
MCCRES. To answer the questions a detailed field study was
conducted in which interviews were completed with 37 Marine
officers of rank from Captain to Colonel who had involvement
with MCCRES as key billet holders.
The results of the study are displayed as an eight-step
feedback model which is based on accepted theory in the fields
of management control and evaluation theory. These results
are communicated to the reader as a descriptive model.
The incorporation of this model as the Standard MCCRES
Feedback Procedure will enhance the value of the results
to the evaluated unit and will improve the understanding of
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The Military has long recognized the need for forces to
be prepared for combat. The United States Marine Corps has
historically been considered this country's force in readi-
ness. A means to evaluate and measure readiness, called the
Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) , was
implemented by the Service in 1977. MCCRES was designed to
provide readiness information to all levels of command. How-
ever, the system's ultimate value lies in the communication of
information to the unit evaluated and to the higher level com-
mands that can support improved allocation of resources and,
ultimately, a higher level of readiness. This research views
the MCCRES from an interdisciplinary perspective and specifically
looks at the economic consideration of improving the allocation
of scarce resources of manpower, equipment and training time.
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to look specifically at the
feedback resulting from a MCCRES evaluation and to consider
all of the MCCRES information available to the Marine Corps





Initially a detailed literature search was conducted into
the areas of management control and evaluation theory.
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Following the detailed literature search, the background and
development of MCCRES was reviewed. The MCCRES is applied
throughout the Marine Corps to evaluate ground and air combat,
as well as combat service support units. Most commonly the
MCCRES is applied at the infantry battalion and aviation
squadron level. In total over 50 MCCRES ' s have been conduc-
ted since implementation in 19 77. Therefore, a sizeable body
of Marine Corps Officers still on active duty have served in
key billets during MCCRES evaluations. To capitalize upon
their experience a field study was conducted which included
interviews with the initial developers of MCCRES (both Marine
and civilian personnel) . In addition key questions on MCCRES
feedback were posed to those who had been involved at all levels
of MCCRES but with special emphasis on those who had served as
unit commanders, senior evaluators , or division or squadron
MCCRES officers. Based on this research the answers to ques-
tions posed by this thesis were answered.
C. ANALYSIS
The information obtained was subjected to two levels of
analysis. First specific responses to the field study were
analyzed through the application of content analysis. Next
an analysis of general responses to the data collected was
conducted identifying MCCRES elements which were repeatedly
presented by those interviewed. Finally, a summary of unsolic-
ited comments were compiled to provide completeness to the
13

study and are suggested as areas for further research on the
subject.
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS
The conclusions and results are provided in the form of a





5. Computerized MCCRES Printout
6. Comparative Percentile Results
7. Follow-up Report
8. Trend Analysis
Overall the MCCRES is viewed as a valuable and necessary
measure of unit readiness. However, to maximize the effec-
tiveness of MCCRES timely distribution of results must be made
to the unit evaluated and all others directly in the chain of
command. The timely distribution of results will allow for
improved resource allocation. Specifically the distribution
of results has a high value for improving the use of limited
training time and the development of doctrine that supports
the effective and efficient use of Marine Corps resources.
Thus regular distribution of generic results should be provided
to all training and doctrine commands throughout the Marine




The Marine Corps is interested in assessing Unit Combat
Readiness. Readiness is generally viewed as the peacetime
level of preparedness to go into combat. The Marine Corps
Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) is designed to
measure units ' level of readiness through simulated combat
conditions as determined by specific criteria set forth in the
form of mission performance standards, tasks and requirements,
and as judged by experienced, expert evaluators [Ref. 1].
The readiness demonstrated is actually a complex set of re-
sults based on the effective allocation of resources by the
service and the unit commander [Ref. 1]. Management control
encompasses all management actions taken by the service and
the unit's commander to bring the unit to peak efficiency.
The evaluation system employed is a detailed effort to quan-
titatively determine the success of that resource allocation.
This chapter explores the key concept of readiness as it has
historically evolved. It discusses the basics of MCCRES and
lays groundwork for the detailed research that is directed at
answering key questions involving feedback of MCCRES data to
the unit commander for the specific purpose of upgrading
deficiencies.
A. MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION SYSTEM (J^CCRES).
Historically the Marine Corps has been called upon as a
ready force to meet contingencies on short notice world-wide.
15

The specific Marine Corps Missions are detailed in the National
Security Act of 194 7. The unique air-ground combat team organi-
zation in which each unit ranging in size from the Battalion-
Landing Team (BLT) to Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) is task
organized with Marine Corps Air, Ground, Combat Support, and
Combat Service Support elements making the organization uniquely
suited to respond rapidly to U.S. global needs. Recent inci-
dents such as the 19 79 Iranian Crisis and the 19 82 Lebanese
Crisis have placed current emphasis on this historic role.
1. Purpose
The operational capabilities of combat units describe
their abilities to function for their intended purpose. It
is, therefore, necessary that some means be used to estimate
their ability to perform their intended mission short of actual
combat. In 19 76 the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) iden-
tified the need to develop an operational readiness evaluation
program. In his Posture Statement to Congress for 19 78, shortly
before MCCRES was foinnally introduced. General Louis H. Wilson,
Commandant of the Marine Corps, made the following statement
describing a need for:
...an improved readiness evaluation system to, provide
a timely and accurate evaluation of the readiness of the
Fleet Marine Forces, including reserve units, to accom-
plish assigned missions. [Ref. 1: p. I-A-1]
The Marine Corps began using the system in July, 19 78. Since
that time the system has been used to test all Marine Corps
Infantry Units, Fixed Wing Squadrons, Rotary Wing and Obser-
vation Squadrons, Combat Support and Combat Service Support
16

element, both regular and reserve, at least once every 24
months. In his FY- 84 Posture Statement to Congress, General
Robert H. Barrow (the Commandant of the Marine Corps) made
the following comment about MCCRES
.
A key element in the readiness equation continues to
be operational performance standards. Even before
these units deploy, we evaluate their capabilities
to accomplish their assigned missions through the
rigorous Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation Sys-
tem. The System objectively evaluates the combat
readiness of all active and reserve FMF (Fleet Marine




The goal of MCCRES is to test the combat readiness of
Marine Corps units. These tests have been developed to evalu-
ate the five types of units mentioned previously. There are
difficulties in applying a standard such as MCCRES. The real
question that needs to be answered for the organization is:
"Can the unit do the job?" [Ref. 3: p. IJ Since the real
answer can only be obtained under actual combat conditions,
we must substitute simulated combat for actual combat. Thus
the question that is answered is: "How close is the execution
to doctrine?" [Ref. 3: p. 1] Thus for MCCRES we test adherence
to doctrine, under simulated combat conditions as a proxy for
the real question.
3 Scoring/Results
The guidance for MCCRES is defined in detail by Marine
Corps Order (MCO) 3501.2, Volumes I-X. This provides details
on how the MCCRES is applied to each type of unit. The evalua-
tion is broken down into ten CIO) categories that are mutually
exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
17

1. Reporting to higher level of coininand.
2. Preparing for operations
3. Communicating (including communications SOP)
4. Performing as Marines (discipline, dispersion,
camouflage, concealment, using weapons, and so on)
5. Delivering supporting fire
6. Planning of operations
7. Conforming to doctrine
8. Executing Operations
9. Providing combat service support (including medical
support)
10. Supervising required actions by individual Marines.
Each category corresponds to a vital aspect of the unit's
performance [Ref . 3]
.
For an Infantry Battalion the evaluation is divided
into 19 Mission Performance Standards, 145 Tasks, and 79 3 Re-
quirements. Each Battalion is not tested on all MPS, Tasks,
and Requirements [Refs. 1, 4]. The final result is a "Combat
Ready/Not Combat Ready" for the unit evaluated based on the
overall judgment of the senior evaluator. Results are also
provided as percentile scores for the Section, MPS, and Tasks.
«
The format for information provided is as follows:
Infantry Unit
Section 2.0 Operations Performed % Score
MPS 2.A Actions by Marines % Score
Task 2.A.1 Discipline % Score
Requirement 2. A. 1.1 Self Discipline % Score*
*Note: Only a yes/no is given for a Requirement, thus
100% = Yes and 0% = No for each Requirement Graded
18

For example, the Infantry Evaluation is subdivided
into four Sections: Section 2. A identifies standards applica-
ble to all evaluations. It is divided into three MPS, the
first of which is Action by Marines. 'Actions by Marines' is
subdivided into 13 Tasks—the first, 'Tasks, Discipline' is
subdivided into nine Requirements. The first of these require-
ments is 'Self-Discipline.' Requirements are evaluated as:
Yes/No/Not Applicable. Section, MPS, Tasks, and Requirements'
overall evaluations are each given a weighted percentile score
based on the number of Yes's for Requirements under the respec-
tive category.
4 . Procedure
The MCCRES is divided for simplicity into five phases.
Phase One requires determining the appropriate MPS to be evalu-
ated based on Marine Corps Order 3501.2, Vol. I, and the appro-
priate volume that applies to the unit being evaluated— for
instance, air or combat-service support. Phase Two consists
of briefing evaluators [Ref. 5]. Phase Three is the actual
evaluation under simulated combat. During this phase the
evaluators actually make the Yes/No evaluations of the require-
ments. They are guided by detailed Key Indicators (KI) which
assist the evaluator in making the appropriate choice [Ref. 4],
Phase Four consists of compiling the evaluation results and
determining the percentile scores as well as the "Combat
Ready/Not Combat Ready" determination by the senior evaluator.
Officially, there is no relationship between the numeri-
cal score for the Battalion and the Combat Ready/Not
19

Combat Ready rating. It is possible, for example,
that one battalion with an overall numerical score of 50
could be judged Combat Ready, while another having a
numerical score of 75 could be judged Not Combat Ready.
[Ref. 6: p. 40]
Phase Five, the final phase, is the debrief of the evaluated
unit by the evaluators as well as the detailed written report
(computer printout) which is provided to the evaluated unit.
Other reports are forwarded to Headquarters Marine Corps (CMC)-
an initial message report within 10 days and the detailed re-
port within 30 working days [Ref. 1]
B. READINESS
At the center of any Readiness Evaluation System is under-
standing what is meant by the key concept of "readiness." The
inherent difficulty in .describing this term makes any evalua-
tion, measure, or model of readiness all the more complex.
Thus we must explore the meaning of "readiness."
1. Definition
Usage of the term "readiness" has tended to change
even at the highest levels within the Department of Defense
(DDD) . In FY 19 77, then Secretary of Defense, Donald H.
Rumsfeld, used the following definition of readiness:
"Readiness" is a concept that integrates the diverse
factors that affect the ability to deploy, engage, and
sustain effective combat forces. It starts with the
overall ability and proficiency of U.S. fighting men...
An equally important determinant of overall readiness
is the availability, capability, and condition of the
force's fighting equipment. [Ref. 7: p. 2]





"Readiness" refers to the capability to respond adequately
to diverse situations and to sustain that response as
long as necessary. The "Readiness" of Defense Combat
Forces depends on a myriad of diverse and often inter-
related factors, [Ref. 7: p. 2]
In recent years the concept has taken a more stan-
dardized definition under the current administration. How-
ever, in reviewing historical literature concerning readiness,
it must be remembered that it does not have consistent meaning
In address to Congress on February 8, 1982, and January 31,
1983, the Secretary of Defense Weinberger used the following
definition:
Readiness is the ability of a forces, units, weapons
systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which
they were designed (including the ability to deploy and
employ without unacceptable delays) . It depends on
having the required quantities of equipment in the hands
of the units on a day-to-day basis and on having the
required number of adequately trained people assigned
with the necessary mix of grades and experience level and
to ensure that people and machines can work together.
[Ref. 8: p. 1-28]
This definition includes training (individual and unit)
,
material, equipment, logistics, and personnel all as part of
the readiness definition.
For the purpose of continuity and brevity, the follow-
ing definition of readiness is used on a day-to-day basis by
the Marine Corps and is the accepted definition from JCS
,
Publication 6, used for the DoD Unit Reporting System
(UNITREP)
.
Readiness: ability of forces, units, weapons systems,
or equipments to deliver outputs for which they were
designed (includes the ability to deploy and employ
without unacceptable delays. [Ref. 9: p. 1]
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It is further amplified as follows:
Readiness is essentially a measure of pre-D-Day status
(extending at most into initial combat operations)
while s us t ainability is a Post-D-Day measure. Hence,
we often speak of peace time readiness , but combat
sustainability . [Ref . 9l pT T]
For consistency this definition of readiness, as amplified,
will be used throughout this study, since it provides the
currently accepted DoD definition. In the literature the
terms 'effectiveness' and 'sustainability' are often inter-
changed to indicate Post-D-Day combat capabilities. Because
of its broader implications the term effectiveness will be
used herein to mean Post-D-Day status. Hereafter we can refer
to Pre-Combat Readiness and Combat Effectiveness .
2 . Indexing
The difficulty in defining readiness may be exceeded
only by the difficulty of measuring it. Many attempts have
been made to index readiness, but to date none have been suc-
cessful or achieved wide acceptance. As described by Barzily,
Marlow, and Zacks, in their "Survey of Approaches to Readiness,"
the motivating factor common to all attempts is to measure
the effects of budgetary changes on readiness. They reviewed
a number of readiness indexes, such as the U.S. Navy METRI
Project, MARIS Project, MAXCAP Models, and others and found
that:
The readiness indexes posed do not attain the desired
objective. They are usually very insensitive to changes
that occur at the lower echelons and, furthermore, they




3 . Economic Question
The context of readiness described in both Definitions
and Indexing has strong economic overtones . The approach
herein will be to treat readiness as an economic question,
i.e., the allocation of scarce resources of training time,
material, equipment, logistics, and personnel as inputs with
the desired results of maximizing outputs. The true output of
a combat organization is effectiveness in combat. There is
obvious difficulty in measuring that output. Because of this
difficulty we generally turn our attention to proxy measures
such as number of aircraft or number of ships. The difficulty
of this problem was recently stated as follows in a study by
Rand for the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Reserve
Affairs, and Logistics:
The output of an Army Maneuver/Firepower Unit is
especially difficult because such units have no single
output or product that can be directly related to
their mission. [Ref. 12: p. 7]
In a recent study by Steven L. Funk, several observa-
tions were made which have application here. He states that
although peacetime Army readiness is an honored theme, it is
not always practical. This is a result of preparedness not
being the actual primary peacetime mission, but just one of
several competing missions that take resources of manpower,
equipment, and training time. Funk cites major factors that
detract from the unit being able to train for combat situations
(1) Lack of resources to accomplish requirements
(i.e., skilled personnel, time, ammunition,
repair parts, and facilities).
23

(2) changing and competing priorities that fragment
resources and negate planning, and
(3) a climate that deprives unit leadership of
decision "maneuver space" and fragments their
attention (i.e., centralized decision making/
control, burdensome administration, low unit
cohesion and ambiguous institutional values.
[Ref. 11: p. 6]
Although the previous study was made of the U.S. Army,
many of the detractors apply equally to the Marine Corps.
Some policies such as Unit Rotation (i.e., the policy of main-
taining unit integrity by replacing an entire battalion/
squadron rather than replacing individuals), and Deployment-
Lock-On periods (i.e., the policy of assigning resources to
a unit well in advance of a planned deployment and then main-
taining and replacing those resources through the training
cycle and into deployment) have lessened the negative effects.
However, in the Marine Corps the problem of competing priori-
ties will always exist. The unit commander is constrained
by many elements beyond his control [Ref. 11] . Thus the ques-
tion of unit readiness is certainly one of economic priorities
or competing priorities. A large part of the readiness results
then depends on the effective resource allocation both to the
unit and within the unit. Thus MCCRES attempts to evaluate
the readiness of a unit through simulated combat conditions
and to measure how closely the unit performance conforms to
doctrine.
C. MCCRES AS THE EVALUATION SYSTEM
1 . Research
The evaluation system employed by the Marine Corps
has undergone much study from the standpoint of developing an

objective versus a subjective system of evaluation. Much of
the statistical work for this has been done by the George
Washington School of Engineering and Applied Science [Refs. 3,
4]. Additionally, the question of evaluator bias was recently
studied at the Naval Postgraduate School, Department of Adminis-
trative Science [Ref . 5]
.
As a result of the George Washington University studies,
it was determined MCCRES had the following merits:
a. Most requirements are requests for descriptive data
and not for judgments. Judgments were previously
made by defining the requirements and assigning
weights.
b. The details of the doctrine are given and interpreted
in the requirements, thus avoiding the possibility
of being mis-interpreted or forgotten by the
evaluators.
c. The execution of most requirements consumes sKort
time periods and thus the evaluators ' memories are
not overburdened.
d. Assigning a score of a YES or NO is easier than
assigning scores on any other scale.
e. The set of the requirements exhausts the details
of the executions. [Ref. 3: p. 25J
Though the George Washington University research identifies
merits of MCCRES, it does not address the question of what
feedback should be provided to the evaluated unit.
2. Feedback
The purpose of this research was to determine the types
of feedback that are most useful and valuable to an evaluated
unit. Feedback is a necessary part of any control or evalua-
tion system. In December, 19 81, B. General A. A. Sordo, then
25

Director of the Marine Corps Training Division, made the
following comment:
The evaluation and feedback process in training is
one where we need to do substantial work. MCCRES
helps us greatly. In the future, as we link the
individual training standards of our ITS System to
MCCRES Mission Performance Standards, we'll be able
to do better! But above and beyond that, our
measurements of adequacy and effectiveness are for
the most part decentralized and highly subjective
and impressionistic. In the long run we rely on
our assessment of the unit or organizational capabili-
ties as the best gauge of adequacy in training
preparation. [Ref. 13: p. 54]
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As a result of the need to define specifically the feed-
back and information needed by evaluated units as the result
of MCCRES, this study was undertaken. The following questions
are asked by this thesi,s:
1. Primary
a. After a MCCRES, what information should be fed
back to the evaluated unit commander?
b. In what form should the evaluation feedback be?
c. What channel (s) should be used to provide the




In addition to the specific questions above, there are
several subsidiary questions which arise as a logical conse-
quence of the primary questions. They involve the following
topics: (1) validity of comparing MCCRES results given under
differing conditions, (2) MCCRES contribution to effective
26

training, and (3) time availability and followup to ensure
correction of deficiencies identified during the MCCRES
.
E. METHODOLOGY OF LITERATURE RESEARCH
To properly answer the questions posed, the author took
a multi-disciplinary approach. The theories of management
control and evaluation provide a great deal of insight toward
understanding the complexities of the information needs. Thus
these two fields will be explored in detail in the next chapter
In addition much work has been done in the area of modeling
effectiveness. This has been done from the perspective of
applied, conceptual, statistical and economic models.
Since these provide rich theories for the understanding of





This chapter was designed to provide a history of MCCRES,
establish the need for such a system from the Marine Corps
perspective, give some basic understanding of the system, and
provide a detailed understanding of the inherent difficulties
of efforts to evaluate the concept of readiness.
Readiness is approached from the standpoint of economics,
that is the application of scarce resources (inputs) of time,
men, materials to the process of simulated combat. The unit
commander controls the organization with a highly sophisticated
management control system in accordance with the external and
27

internal objectives and policies. MCCRES is a unit evaluation
system which evaluates the management control process of that
organization. The primary questions are then presented as
the basis of this research. The following chapters will ex-
plore briefly the theory of management control systems and
in detail evaluation theories and models with specific empha-
sis on feedback mechanisms.
28

III. MANAGEMENT, MANAGEMENT CONTROL, EVALUATION,
AND FEEDBACK
The topics to be covered in this chapter are as follows:
first the topic of management will be described in a general
context; management control and its implications for feedback
will be explored; then, a series of selected evaluation
theories will be presented in detail. Finally a series of
evaluation models with application to the military will be
provided. Emphasis in these models will be on feedback
theory and the ideas on feedback posed by the authors.
A summary of feedback as developed by the models will be pre-
sented also.
A . I^ANAGEMENT
Management is described as: (l)"art or act of managing;
conduct; control; direction. (2) Judicious use of means to
accomplish an end; skillful treatment" [Ref . 14j . Webber
describes it in many contexts--experience, training, practice,
theory, art, and science [Ref. 15]. The simplest definition
and one often heard is the art of getting things done through
people. The elements, however, that all descriptions of
management have in common are that managers engage in two
important activities: planning and control [Ref. 16j . It is
important to clearly make the distinction between the terms
management and leadership. The military has long recognized
29

that the term "leader" has much broader implications than that
of manager. The unit is more than the sum of its parts; and,
therefore, the military commander's responsibility is not only
for the technical and tactical proficiency of the unit, but
for the overall cohesive functioning of the organization [Ref,
17] . In this context it is fair to say that management skills
are a necessary subset of leadership and that the good leader
is necessarily a good manager, however, the converse of that
statement is not necessarily true.
B. MANAGEMENT CONTROL
Robert Anthony placed management control in a hierarchical
framework as follows in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1. Anthony Framework
He described this classification for any large organization
where these functions are present.
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strategic planning is the process of deciding on
objectives of the organization, on changes in the
objectives, on resources used to attain these
objectives, and on the policies that are to govern
the acquisition, use, and disposition of these
resources. [Ref. 18: p. 16]
He further described management control as follows:
Management control is the process by which managers
assure that resources are obtained and used effec-
tively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the
organization's objectives. [Ref. 18: p. 17]
Strategic planning is the highest level of management
where the long, range objectives, policies, and plans of the
organization are made . The management control level involves
middle management, the timeframe is shorter, about 12 months,
and the planning involves budgeting, training, etc. The lowest
level of control is operational where the day-to-day function-
ing of the organization is carried on; the implementation of
plans and policies are executed at this level.
Lebas describes management control as an enlarged feedback
loop which affects human behavior and performance [Ref. 19 J
.
Hofstede also provides a useful definition of management con-
trol "...as a pragmatic concern for results, obtained through
people" [Ref. 24: p. 193].
Given the purpose of this study is to identify feedbaclc
needed for improved resource allocation, it is important to
focus on the terms "effectiveness" and "efficiency", which are
present in many of the definitions of management control. In




Effectiveness .. .relates to the accomplishment of the
cooperative purpose .. .when a specific desired end
is attained we shall say that the action is effective.
[Ref. 18: p. 27]
Efficiency. . .refers to the engineering sense of...
the optimum relationship between given inputs and
outputs. [Ref. 18: p. 27]





The Organizational Process Approach is that taken by
Anthony. He divides the feedback loop into three distinct
parts, described previously as strategic planning and manage-
ment control and operational control. This approach reduces
the human motivational problem to what Anthony calls "goal
congruence" or the various ways in which the manager can be
encouraged to take actions which are in the best interest of
the company. The goal congruence is then reduced to procedures
within the organization such as performance evaluation, report-
ing, and budgeting [Ref. 19].
2 Informational Economics Approach
The Informational Economics Approach is a more abstract
theory. It proposes that only models based on expected utility
maximization need to be considered. A set of subjective
probabilities are assumed to be known by the decision-maker
and that the decision-maker will always act to maximize utility,
In this approach, good performance is described as the action
which minimizes the end result differences between the expected
outcomes and the actual outcomes. The emphasis, however, is
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on the decision model not the outcome. A further aspect of
the theory is its emphasis on maximizing the expected utility.
This leads to the conclusion that the control process is a
prior phenomenon that suggests management spend more time
preparing decisions than evaluating outcomes [Ref . 19]
.
The major limitation to the Information Economics Ap-
proach is that it is all based on the Savage-Rational Man
Model and that an effort will be made to maximize utility in
every case. Although an interesting theoretical model, it
relies heavily on the calculus of maximizing utility in each
and every case [Ref. 19].
3. Behavioral Approach
This is actually a loosely structured set of approaches
to the concept of management control taking ideas from many
theories. Two descriptive ideas that it entails from Herbert
Simon are:
Satisf icing ... interrupting the action selection process
as soon as the first acceptable action has been found.
And
Bounded Reality ... the notion that man is a piecewise
rational. [Ref. 19]
Other ideas presented by Ouchi and referred to by
Lebas have shown that:
...rigorous output control is the most effective way
to induce good performance in managers. [Ref. 19]
Other topics in the behavioral approach deal with the
structural and inter-personal variables in management control.
The power, therefore, of each structural center lies in its
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ability to reduce uncertainty for other units. The inter-
personal effects on behavior are viewed by Lebas in terms of
Kantz and Kahn ' s model of role sender and role receiver. Here
the control will be good if the expectations are interpreted
accurately by the receiver and if the single receiver is not
subjected to conflicts in role expectations in the different
social systems in which it operates. Additionally, control
requires acceptance of the role by the receiver [Ref. 19J
.
Lebas views the real value of behavioral approaches
in their diversity and being based on observations of people
in real situations. The limitations come from their multi-
plicity and that creates difficulty in setting any sort of
coherent guidelines for a manager to employ [Ref. 19J
.
4 . Integrated Approach
The previous broad structures of management control
system have been integrated by Ansari in what he refers to
as an operational systems concept [Ref. 20] . He views the
previous perspectives on management control systems in two
versus three broad categories. Grouping the structural view
(Operational Process and Informational Economics) and the be-
havioral views:
a. Two Perspectives
Ansari describes the structural view of management
control as that adapted by researchers in cybernetics, account-
ing, and management information systems—those that concentrate
primarily on the information and communications aspects of
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control systems. The behavioral approaches are identified as
those that are based primarily on human behavior in organi-
zations and regard control as a problem of encouraging sub-
ordinates to achieve performance goals. In this context he
uses control system to describe:
...those arrangements and actions designated to
facilitate its members to achieve higher performance
with least unintended consequences. [Ref. 20: p. 102]
b. Elements of Management Control Systems
There is agreement among most authors reviewed
from both the structural and behavioral schools that all
management control systems consist of two elements. The
first being "an information network which prescribes the rules
for measurement , collection, processing, and transmission of
information" [Ref. 20: p. 102]. This element causes the
information on performance, goals, outputs, and exceptions
from plans to be transmitted to managers. The second element
is the set of social relationships through which the control
system achieves the organizational goals [Ref. 20J
.
c. Joint Consideration
Ansari argues that management control is actually
best approached from a combination of the structural and be-
havioral ideas. He declares that the current phase of design
is more situational and that it focuses on the more important
issue of improving performance instead of the narrow concept
of constraining behavior. The information that is provided
passes through two phases. First, it must be perceived before
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it can be used and second not only managers, but subordinates,
must also use information for self-evaluation and guidance of
performance. He further identifies five considerations which
are characteristic of all information structures.
1. Nature of Measures—the subordinates' motivation
is affected by the completeness, objectivity,
and influence of the characteristics of perfor-
mance measures.
2. Source and Order of Presentation—The source of
the information must be credible and the order
of presentation can change the perceptions of
the information.
3. Timing—Both the speed and frequency are impor-
tant, too long an interval may cause the user
to lose interest or be distracted.
4. Route—The route may alter the infoirmation and
thus the sender and receiver may not be sharing
the same information.
5. Shared Information—The others with whom the
information is shared thus may affect the recipi-
ent's view of the information with regard to
fairness and accuracy. [Ref. 20J
All of these considerations must be made by the
designer in any information, evaluation system. To summarize
the characteristics of the integrated model, this takes into
account both the structure of the organization and its infor-
mational systems as well as the social side considering subor-
dinate personality and leadership style. The designer of a
management control system should combine components (such as
an evaluation system) in such a way as to minimize cognitive
conflicts and encourage behavior which resolves conflict with
positive results for the organization. It should also be kept
in mind that if rewards for performance are too highly
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contingent on outputs of the information structure, the greatej
the chance that there will be controversy over the output
[Ref. 20], A good example of this controversy is discussed
by Anthony Hopwood in the way in which accounting data was
used in the performance evaluation of managers.
Based upon a study he conducted, Hopwood identi-
fied four ways in which accounting data was used in evaluation,
(1) Budget Constrained Style—required to meet a budget
but not concerned about costs.
(2) Budget Profit Style—concerned with both meeting a
budget and with costs.
(3) Profit Conscious Style—concerned with costs but not
with meeting a budget.
(4) Non-Accounting Style—not concerned with meeting a
budget or with costs. [Ref. 21]
He concluded that based on management style, many dysfunc-
tional behaviors may occur as the result of emphasis on
accounting data results in evaluations [Ref. 21]
.
5. Other Thoughts on Management Control
Management control contains many rich concepts which
play a great part in the theory of evaluations. San Miguel
has made several interesting observations on management
control:
The end is a system that enable managers to make sound
decisions as to the efficient and effective allocation
of human, physical, and financial resources to attain
the objectives of the organization. [Ref. 22: p. 177J
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San Miguel further characterizes management science's
attempts to deal with modeling of complex control systems.
He characterizes the quantitative and economic decision tools'
attempt to simplify the decision making in large scale organi-
zations as falling short of their objectives
—
primarily be-
cause of the lack of knowledge of human behavior and the
ability to quantify it. He further cites measurement and
communications to be at the center of control systems, internal
planning, and reporting. There is general agreement in the
management control literature that measurement and communica-
tions systems have an important impact on the behavior of
individuals in organizations, their motivations and, thus,
their performance. Therefore, the areas of measurement and
evaluation are legitimate concerns for the design of any
management control system [Ref. 22].
6 . Summary
The intent in this section was to set the stage through
the discussion of the broader topics, management and manage-
ment control, for what is to be developed in the next section
on evaluation. Management control is a complex topic which
encompasses the broad aspects of all the control systems im-
posed on the organization through strategic plans and policies
as well as those developed within to assist the manager in
his control internally.
C. EVALUATION OVERVIEW
Evaluation models that are directed at readiness all
embody a common goal . Each in its own particular way attempts
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to identify a definitive measure or some particular relative
measure of the unit's Pre-D-Day preparedness for combat.
Preparedness may be viewed as readiness which acts as a proxy
measure for the military unit's ability to perform in combat.
Similar efforts are made to evaluate the ability to perform
in civilian organizations. In its simplest form, output is
measured by production level or quantity produced by a produc-
tion facility in a given time period. Various attempts are
also made to measure profitability of the firm. Microeconomic
theory assumes that each firm is attempting to maximize profit
[Ref. 23] . Therefore, some measure(s) are applied to the
fiscal results of each period to determine the financial per-
formance of the organization during the period [Ref. 23J .
#
Similarly it can be assumed that each unit tries to maximize
its readiness. This section reviews efforts that have been
made to evaluate, measure, and model performance both in
theory and practice. This section covers the general theory
of evaluation, and looks at several well-known evaluation
systems.
1. Evaluation Defined
The term evaluation is defined differently by various
authors; however. Stufflebeam brings together three generally
accepted definitions of evaluation and provides a comparison,
a. Measurement Definition
Evaluation is identical to measurement. It builds
on attempts to measure psychological attributes or character-





Evaluation is a comparison of the congruence
between performance and objectives. This provides emphasis
on objective performance also [Ref. 24].
The measurement definition considered evaluation
to occur after the fact and to measure some attribute. In
contrast the congruence definition refers to on-going evalua-
tion in meeting the objectives [Ref. 27] . According to
Stufflebeam organizations will pick objectives which are
specific and have objective measureable results. That is be-
cause to maJce the congruence definition worlc, there must be
some selection of objectives to be measured. Stufflebeam
further indicates that the congruence definition creates a
need for the evaluator to find short term measures of per-
formance. These indicators, identifiable outputs, or behaviors
come to be viewed as performance. These identifiable outputs
become the ultimate criteria of all organizational decisions.
The congruence definition has advantages, but the need to
find measureable objectives creates problems [Ref. 24J
.
c. Judgment Definition
The professional judgment definition allows full
evaluation of all organizational attributes both quantifiable
and non-quantifiable, and is easy to implement iRef. 24].
This definition is often applied where the dimensions to be
measured are difficult to define and more difficult to quan-
tify. The judgment definition has its problems. The evaluation
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is, by definition, based upon the judgment of an individual
which lacks objectivity identifying what data are used and
how they are used [Ref. 24].
Table (3.1), taken from Stufflebeam, provides a




There is a good deal of general agreement that for
an evaluation to be effective it must be consistent with the
purposes, objectives, and goals of the activity being
evaluated [Refs. 5,25,26].
a. Evaluations must be conducted in terms of purpose
—
the evaluator and the evaluated must fully participate
and work for the common goal
.
b. Evaluation must be cooperative—all involved as both
the evaluators and evaluated must fully participate
and work for the common goal
c. Evaluation must be continuous— it must be on-going;
a one time effort with no followup is an affront to
the professional concepts
.
d. Evaluation must be specific—specificity is the key,
generalizations do little good to help remedy defi-
ciencies or to identify true strengths.
e. Evaluation must provide the means and focus for
trainers to be able to appraise themselves, their
practices, and their products.
f. Evaluation must be on a uniform and objective methods
and standards.
3. Summary
The definition and principles of evaluation were pre-
sented in this section. The evaluation definition as described
by Stufflebeam has three distinct interpretations. There is


















High degree of integra-









No time lag v\^ile wait-
ing for data analysis
Inflexible because of time
and cost to produce new
instruments
Obscures judgments and the
criteria for making them
Eliminates variables cur-
rently considered as not
measurable or labels than
unimportant
Places evaluator in technical
role
Focuses narrowly on objectives
Elevates behavior as the
ultimate criterion of every
action
Focuses on evaluation as a
terminal process
Dictated mainly because




Not susceptible to ordinary
scientific, prudential
measures
Both data and criteria are
ambiguous
Generalization very difficult
Source: Adopted from Ref . 24: p. 15.
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to a large degree these embody a common sense approach for the
usefulness of any evaluation. Next, four evaluation theories
will be presented.
D. EVALUATION THEORY '
There are many theories of evaluation. There is no attempt
herein to be all inclusive. What is intended is to introduce
a variety of theories which exist and to show their relation-
ship to the questions pursued in this research.
1. Management by Objective (MBO)
In recent years probably no system of personnel manage-
ment has gained more attention than Management by Objective
introduced by Peter Drucker [Ref. 27]. The MBO approach is
applied to individual as well as organizational evaluation sys-
tems .
The MBO Approach assumes that one would perform more
effectively because you have planned your own objectives
and could control your own behavior. [Ref. 15: p. 316]
MBO takes a humanistic or human values approach to
managing people. The basic steps in MBO are as follows:
1. The subordinate proposes goals for the next time
period.
2. The subordinate and superior discuss, modify, and
reach agreement.
3. Periodic formal and frequent informal review.
4. Subordinate reports on performance at the end of
the period.
5. Repeat the cycle. [Ref. 15: p. 316]
MBO deals well with a number of problem areas in evaluation
systems. It is designed to create more two-way communication.
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It has found success in both the private and public sector.
In their article on "Employee Growth Through Performance
Management," Beer and Ruhr found success with employment of
MBO at Corning Glass Co. [Ref. 28]. In addition, the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare found it a most valuable
system in pursuing management and control of their many diver-
sified programs [Ref. 29]. Figure 3.2 provides a simple model
of how MBO is designed. It should be noted that the MBO model
focuses on performance as identified and measured through ob-
jectives agreed upon by supervisor and subordinate [Ref. 30].
Feedbac]<: in the MBO System is scheduled at regular
intervals. The meetings can be used to compare results to
the objectives set as well as to help make future objectives
more realistic. The objectives themselves are determined by
higher level management, but in coordination with the employee
or unit. To a great extent the comparison of goals set and
achieved are reported by the individual being evaluated.
Typically the manager submits an evaluation of each objective




Feedback is handled by face to face conferences between the
evaluator and employee.
In a recent Marine Corps Gazette article. Major James
































Source: Adapted from [Ref. 30: p. 22 3]
Figure 3.2. Sample MBO Model
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pay system used with high level GS employees. He referred
to MBO in the context of a personnel evaluation system; how-
ever, it also has application here:
To improve performance counseling, we must get away
from subjective judgments through a more formal system
which concentrates on objectives. The merit pay
system provides a good model. [Ref. 31: p. 47]
Major Clarke's article provided support for the iyiBO
method because clear objectives are established and regular
communications are encouraged. In the Marine Corps' personnel
system, as in other areas of inspection and evaluation, pro-
fessional judgment has historically been used as the primary
method of evaluation and lack of specific objectives has rein-
forced the reliance on the judgmental method.
MBO places a great emphasis on the objectives and the
regular feedback on how the evaluated worker is measuring up
to those objectives [Ref. 15] . MBO further emphasizes dis-
playing the individual's strengths and weaknesses to himself,
rather than to others. Although MBO emphasizes timely, accu-
rate, and objective feedback, the details of that feedback
can only be spelled out when a system is input to a specific
organization [Ref. 28] . It further encourages the feedback
be given on a continual basis, not "saved up for an end of
the year inquisition" [Ref. 15: p. 317].
2. Evaluation and Authority
A comprehensive and ongoing study of evaluation and
authority was conducted by Scott and Dornbusch (19 77) . In
their study of professional organizations, results were
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gathered from university faculty members, clergy, public school
teachers, principals, nurses, and others. They found:
Organizations are power structures in which some
participants give differential access to organizational
rewards and penalties in order to control other
participants. [Ref. 32: p. 134]
The Scott-Dornbusch studies present a conceptual model
of the relation of evaluation and authority. As a result of














Source: Adapted from [Ref. 32: p. 20]
Figure 3.3. Model of Evaluation Process with Communica-
tion Links Among Right-Holders
The model is a systems analysis approach which provides for
monitoring and regulating by means of a feedback loop. This
approach concentrates on the involvement of each actor in the
process. The actors in the Scott-Dornbusch model are described
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as follows: The allocator gives the responsibility for per-
forming the task. The criteria setter is concerned with
assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of a task per-
formance. To a large measure the criteria is determined by
the goal toward which the performance is directed. The
determination of which information to use in order to arrive
at a performance evaluation is the responsibility of the
sampler . The appraiser uses the information on the sampled
indicators and transforms the observed values into scores.
The goal of the evaluation process is to provide a measure of
the performer based on performance and outcome [Ref . 32]
.
The manager must get each of these individuals in the decision-
making process and coordinate their activities. Emphasis is
placed in this model on communications among the right-holders.
The right-holders are those given authorized power or authority
rights by the organization. The authority rights are granted
to the allocator, criteria setter, sampler and appraiser.
There are a variety of interconnecting links which may exist
between these rights-holders which define the authority struc-
ture within any given organization. Thus the formal evalua-
tion process is based on the structure of the interconnection
among the right-holders [Ref. 32 J
.
The Evaluation and Authority Feedback Model describes
performance by direct and indirect measures. Examples could
be the number of units produced as a measure of labor produc-
tivity (direct) . An indirect measure is the number of professional
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papers written to evaluate the productivity of a scientist or
scholar [Ref. 32]. The variety of samples requires judgment
on the part of the evaluator to determine what is high or low
performance so judgment must be used by the evaluator. Thus,
accurate appraisal of the sample taken requires a complete
knowledge of the task, the performance, and the specific
circumstances. Based on all of these measures the decision
is then made on what, and if anything, should be conveyed to
the performer concerning quality of the task performed [Ref.
32] .
3 . Practice of Program Evaluation
Anderson and Ball take an applied approach to program
evaluation. They identify six specific purposes of program
evaluation [Ref. 33] :
1. to contribute to decision about program installation,
2. to contribute to decisions about program continuation,
expansion, or certification,
3. to contribute to decisions about program modifications
,*
4. to obtain evidence to rally support for a program,
5. to obtain evidence to rally opposition to a program,
6. to contribute to the understanding of basic psychologi-
cal, social, and other programs. [Ref. 33: p. 4]
Anderson and Ball emphasize the practice aspect that
evaluations can address a wide variety of questions and pro-
vide many useful services. Their experience is primarily with
social programs, but it is applicable to this study. They




1. The experimental and quasi-experimental study,
2. Correlation methods,
3. Surveys,
4. Personnel or client assessment,
5. Systematic expert judgment,
6. Clinical or case studies,
7. Informal observation and testimony.
The real richness of ideas presented by Anderson and
Ball involve their emphasis on feedback which they refer to
as the: Communication and Dissemination of Results. They
emphasive the need for communications of the results to be
bi-directional. The effective communications of results are
viewed as a sign of the positive health of the program. Evalu-
ators should take pride in presenting and disseminating their
results. The dissemination is more than merely a phase tacked
on the end of a program; it involves more than simply telling
the findings. At a minimum, what the dissemination involves
is that the results should include information about the evalu-
ation plans and procedures as well as the findings. There are
also several criteria provided to guide the dissemination to
various audiences. First, if an evaluation is worth doing,
other groups than the evaluated organization have some inter-
est in finding out about the results. Second, is that, given
different audiences, several mediums/methods of dissemination
may be called for. Anderson and Ball classify some fifteen
different audiences that should at least be considered for
dissemination of results [Ref . 33] .
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Use of results is another consideration once the evalu-
ation is completed. The logical expectation is that the
decision maker will use the results to make rational future
decisions. Weiss lists several reasons why that is not alv/ays
the case. The nature of the organization is som.etimes opposed
to the use of the results; however, if the decision maker and
the evaluator have maintained close communications throughout
the process, the potential objections can be reduced [Refs. 33,
34] . Particular consideration must be given not only to factual
evaluation of each program, but also the salesmanship aspect
of presenting the evaluations.
Anderson and Ball have adapted, from a paper by J. S.
Berke a structure which they suggest should be applied when
writing evaluation reports.
•Brevity and clarity. Critical findings should be
summarized clearly and simply at the outset.
•Timeliness— to be useful and utilized, results must
be reported according to other peoples' schedules and
not the evaluator 's research clock.
•Interim products and reports--these help prepare
decision makers for the impact of larger, later evalua-
tion reports. Besides, they can allow preliminary
planning for utilization even before the final report
is available.
•Responsiveness—he notes here that traditional researchers
tend to make questions more interesting, design more
elegant, analysis more comprehensive, and utilization
of recommendations more guarded than necessary.
[Ref. 33: pp. 107-108]
In summary the program evaluator has the responsibility
to push the results of the evaluation and to bring them to




4 . Critical Incident Evaluation
Critical Incident Evaluation Program involves manage-
ment writing regular reports on the performance they observe.
The critical incident process has as its roots the idea that
actual behavior should be appraised, not traits of behavior.
It is an attempt to justify ratings based on specific incidents
that provide support evidence for the evaluation. Levinson
places strong emphasis on the need to evaluate on how things
get done and not just results [Ref. 36]. Levinson argues that
in reality people are evaluated on the "how", but many are
led to believe that they are just judged based on results.
Thus, the profit oriented manager pulls his company
out of the "red", but is criticized for the methods used to
do it. Levinson cites many deficiencies with current evalua-
«
tion systems. One is that no matter how well-defined the dimen-
sions for appraising performance on a quantitative basis,
judgments on performance are always subjective and impression-
istic [Ref. 36]. Second, delay in giving feedback creates
frustration both when performance is good and credit is de-
served, and when performance is bad and criticism is rendered
long after the performance. Levinson views performance evalua-
tion not as a technique, but a process involving both people
and data. Thus, the process is inadequate [Ref. 36 J
.
Levinson proposes that an effective critical incident
model be composed of the following [Ref. 36]:
1. A dynamic job description—one which amplifies
statements of job responsibility and desired
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outcome by describing the emotional and behavioral
topography of the task.
2. A critical incident process—this requires jointly
setting objectives and discussing each piece of
behavior that is judged good or bad by the manager.
3. A psychological support system—to accomplish
this, the manager must learn to cope with feelings
or guilt over the appraisal. He calls this upward
appraisal concept in which managers who develop
employees through their effective appraisal should
be compensated [Ref. 36]
An interesting aspect was observed by Winton-Oberg
while observing the use of the critical incident process at
General Electric:
People who received honest but negative feedback are
typically not motivated to do better and often do
worse after appraisal interviews. [Ref. 35: p. 64]
The whole critical incident process involves a con-
tinuous flow of feedback to the evaluated employee.
Although the critical incident process by its very
nature should lead to a continuous review and communication
on positive and negative behavior, that is not always the
case. Also the critical incident itself is often a subjec-
tive evaluation on the part of the supervisor. The system
should focus attention on actual behavior rather than on
employee traits. Also it provides an opportunity for the
employee to find out specifically how to perform if he wants
to be rated higher the next time. This system does encourage
regular feedback since the supervisor can hardly wait to the
end of a period to feedback what he sees as a critical inci-
dent [Ref. 35]. One of the major factors supporting this
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system is that the critical incident process takes the sur-
prise out of the annual or semi-annual evaluation. All those
.
incidents viewed by the supervisor as critical would have
already been brought to the attention of and discussed with
the subordinate. This technique provides more regular feed-
back to the subordinate because both good and bad incidents
should be noted continually. Also if the employee feels un-
fairly judged, he may appeal the criticism immediately rather
than waiting a long period of time [Ref. 36].
E. SPECIFIC EVALUATION MODELS APPLIED TO THE MILITARY
The approaches to the evaluation process discussed thus
far have been general in nature. However, in this study evalu-
ation processes specific to military environments were also
reviewed. Following are four evaluation approaches to the
military which were reviewed in detail.
1. Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)
The Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) for
Infantry Battalions was reviewed during this research. In
addition a detailed brief was provided by the G-3 , 7th Infantry
Division [Ref. 37]. The Army Program specifics are laid out
for Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, and Ranger units in one
volume [Ref. 3 8] . That guide is further supported by local
guidance at each command.
The Infantry ARTEP Evaluation has four purposes: (other





1. Establish infantry unit training missions with
specified tasks, conditions, and standards of
performance for combat-critical missions.
2. Under simulated combat conditions, train and
evaluate the ability of the unit.
3. Evaluate the effectiveness of past training of all
echelons of the Battalion.
4. Assess future training needs. [Ref. 38]
The evaluation is broken into three phases:
1. Critique of Leaders
2. Evaluation of Whole Battalion
3. Written Report
The ARTEP employs the following philosophy:
1. The evaluation is conducted two levels down (Division
evaluates Battalion)
2. Battalion ARTEP • s are scheduled every 18 months.
3. Companies/Platoons/Squadrons are evaluated annually.
4. Subunit evaluators focus on the end evaluation.
5. Evaluations are scheduled in sequential progression
(squad, platoon, company, then battalion)
6. Scheduled preparation time is five weeks for a Battalion
7. Fence off the unit for two weeks following the exer-
cise (no other requirements are placed on the unit
during this period)
8. Use operating force tactics




The ARTEP Evaluations are strictly conducted within the
divisional unit. The Assistant Division Commander is desig-
nated "exercise director," but a sister battalion is desig-
nated as the force to provide the senior evaluator, another
lieutenant colonel as well as company and other evaluators
.
The ARTEP is viewed as a training evaluation.
The ARTEP System provides a combination of both objec-
tive and subjective feedback to the evaluated unit. All of
the tasks evaluated in the ARTEP evaluation are reported on a
Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory basis. All unsatisfactory or not
evaluated ratings must be explained in the remarks. This
data is placed on a standardized data collection sheet. A
copy is provided to the evaluated unit shortly after the
exercise is completed. Additionally a copy of the data sheet
is forwarded (without any identifying unit data) to the U.S.
Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA. The data forwarded
to higher headquarters is for the purpose of future training
development efforts and for use in improving the ARTEP doc-
trine, devices, and techniques Army-wide [Ref . 3 8] . The over-
all evaluation given to a unit is a Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory
No percentile scores are associated with or computed for the
ARTEP results. Thus no comparison is made from unit to unit
using ARTEP data {Ref. 37]
.
In addition to the written report, a continuous review
and exchange of comments between the evaluator and unit is
encouraged. Shortly after the ARTEP is completed, an oral
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debrief is held for all key personnel of the battalion and
the evaluators . In some cases the detailed (good) evaluations
of units to the squad level are announced to all of the troops
at formation. This technique is viewed as a positive motivation
for the small units and their leaders [Ref . 37]
.
2 . Funk Conceptual Model of Unit Performance
A recent study by Steven Funk [Ref. 11] attempted to
model combat unit effectiveness for the U.S. Army. He found
many of the same difficulties in defining effectiveness that
this author found in defining readiness. He described effec-
tiveness as follows:
Individual evaluators determine unit effectiveness
based upon some explicit or intuitive constraint of what
units are supposed to do and how that is achieved.
Unit effectiveness is determined by evaluating both
outcomes and processes, and is determined for perfor-
mance on all tasks presented to the unit whether they
are combat related or not. [Ref. 11: p. 19]
He interviewed groups of officers and senior enlisted,
primarily battalion commanders, company cominanders , staff
officers, unit officers, and first sergeants. He also reviewed
a wide array of existing predictive models from the Army, Navy,
and Air Force. He identified early readiness studies such
as Army Training Study (ARTS) 19 77-19 78, which concluded that
readiness should be viewed from a perspective of relationships
among personnel, weapons, equipment, resources, detractors,
and incentives. He also looked at the Navy's 19 74 report on
readiness which stated, "Organizational effectiveness implies
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an evaluative or judgmental process against an expectation or
standard" [Ref. 11: p. 11].
The result of his studies concluded that military unit
effectiveness is far more readily conceptualized than measured
[Ref. 11] . Part of the problem of measuring military unit
effectiveness is operationally defining readiness in a peace-
time environment.
Fun>c referenced Etzioni who noted that organizations
attempt to achieve a balanced distribution of resources across
needs and did not attempt to maximize satisfaction in one
area [Ref. 11] . Funk concluded that military units in peace-
time have great difficulty in maximizing effectiveness or
readiness because they really face not one objective, but a
whole array of competing priorities all calling for their
resources. His studies resulted in the proposed conceptual
model in Figure 3.4.
This model is referred to as the Unit Performance Sys-
tems model. It describes behavior as the interrelationships
of technology, formal and informal unit structure, perceived
unit requirements and priorities, available resources, unit
climate, unit process, cause of evaluation of unit actions,
and the unit operating environment [Ref. 11]
.
3. Hayes et al. Statistical Model of Combat Effectiveness
In 19 77, a cross-sectional study for the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency was conducted. An effort was
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Figure 3.4. Unit Performance Systems Model
[Ref. 11: p. 38]
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factors which contributed to levels of success in 22 combat
engagements ranging from World War II to Vietnam. The study-
was aimed at determining the effectiveness of infantry battalions
based on the judgment of experienced Marine Corps officers in-
volved in these engagements. Multi-variate statistical analy-
sis was used to examine the data results. The study revealed
that adaptive behavior by units, that is reaction to the com-
bat environment, was the single most important discriminator
between successful and unsuccessful performance. They also
identified three types of activity which appeared to be closely
related to mission accomplishment: command and planning
(strongly related) , supporting fires (moderately associated)
,
and coordination function (relatively weak and appeared to re-
quire effective command and planning before it made a differ-
ence) [Ref . 17]
.
This study defined "combat effectiveness" as
. . .the ability of a unit to accomplish a military
mission. As such, combat effectiveness refers to
performance in a hostile environment. [Ref. 17: pp. 1-2]
As such the focus on the effectiveness of a military unit is
placed on outcomes and effectiveness and can only be measured
by mission accomplishment. The infantry battalion was seen
as not operating in a vacuum, but rather in a world of obsta-
cles and constraints. Thus the adaptability was an important
element in performance. Besides adaptability, Hayes identified
a number of key elements which included:
•maneuver during the action




•quality of planning and information as well as others,
[Ref. 17: pp. 1-18]
This study was done during the period when MCCRES was
being developed. One important observation made here with
regard to feedback was that, although MCCRES is comprehensive
and standardized, a great deal of information is currently
passing through the hands of the evaluators that could be ex-
tremely valuable to the evaluated units [Ref. 17]
.
4 . Sassone Economic Model of Training Effectiveness
A fourth approach to effectiveness is taken by Sassone,
who has taken an economic viev; which is different from the
traditional economic approach to evaluating military training
programs. The traditional approach is to evaluate the train-
ing on its projected costs and benefits. The Sassone approach
requires that any new training program be compared directly
with existing programs that it will replace or amplify. Tra-
ditionally equipment and training are judged simply on their
ability to function for the intended purpose. The training
programs are particularly difficult to evaluate because of
necessity of measuring the impact of the training on the
trainee. In the private sector training programs are gener-
ally judged on their effectiveness by the change in lifetime
earnings of the trainee after the program [Ref. 39]. If the
cost of the training program is less than the lifetime increase
in wages, then this program is judged to be economically
worthwhile. However, training programs in the military cannot
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be judged this same way, because there is no way to measure
their contribution toward readiness, sustainability , or effec-
tiveness since these are not commodities or traded in the
market place [Ref. 39].
Sassone's methodology requires that when a new type of
training for an individual or unit is developed, it must be
stated in specific terms to what extent it substitutes for
existing programs. The constraint in this case is the train-
ing budget for the specific type of training. There are three
steps in this methodology [Ref. 39]
.
(1) An equation relating training inputs and outputs must
be developed. This requires a comparison of the two types





J^ Training type 2 Training type 1
Source: Adapted from [Ref. 39: p. 40]




The figure shows different levels of effectiveness which can
be achieved with various combinations of the two types of
training. The curve shows all the levels of effectiveness
which can be achieved with the various combinations. The
shape of the curves describe the substitute ability of one
training type for the other.
(2) Relationship of cost and use data must be obtained.
There are three types of costs involved: front end costs for
the training program under evaluation; operational costs, and
training budgets for the training manager of the program.
(3) The last step requires the development of a relation-
ship between training and effectiveness.
Where potentially greater effectiveness is available
at greater cost, the issue is simply whether the
greater effectiveness is worth the greater cost.
[Ref. 39: p. 41]
Sassone fails to specify how ' this relation of training and
effectiveness is obtained. It is assumed by this researcher
that it refers to some evaluation method such as MCCRES
.
Measures such as those generalized by ARTEP allow for no rela-
tive measure of effectiveness which is required for this
type of comparison.
The cost effectiveness equation is then developed by
optimum use of available training resources at each level of
the training budget. The term "optimum" in Sassone 's proposal
is one that seems to be in conflict with other theorists.
Funk [Ref. 11] for instance indicates that many competing
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priorities take resources from the unit thus precluding
optimality of resource application.






^ Level of effectiveness
Source; Adapted from [Ref. 39: p. 41]
Figure 3.6. The Military Value of a Training Program
Figure 3.6 is described by Sassone as starting at a
minimal level, indicating that some level of effectiveness
would exist even without training. The curve initially rises
rapidly but starts to level off as maximum effectiveness is
reached. As better training programs are conceived, the mid-
dle of this curve would shift up. If some new program were a
perfect substitute of an existing one, the new curve would
overlay the existing one and be exactly the same curve. Various
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shifts in the curve up can be caused by a greater level of
effectiveness achieved for a lower cost. The Figure 3.6 shows
how the military value of various training programs can be
compared with other or existing programs. In addition one
must consider opportunity costs, funds used for research and
development of new programs which the service could otherwise
have devoted to existing programs [Ref. 39],
The military value of the new training program is repre-
sented by the increment in the current training budget
needed to increase effectiveness by the same amount
as the increase in effectiveness associated with the
new program. [Ref. 39: p. 42]
The opportunity cost of a new military training program is
determined by spreading the front end costs equally over the
units trained per year and the expected life time of the
program applying the appropriate discount rate. Figure 3.6
is used to compare the 'military value of a training program by
using the cost-effectiveness ratio: if the military value
is less than the opportunity cost, then the new program would
not be considered economically feasible [Ref. 39]
.
5. Summary
This section reviewed four approaches to evaluation
that have recently been developed for applications to the mili-
tary. The ARTEP employed [Ref. 38] by the Army provided a
process of evaluation which has much in common with MCCRES
especially in its application to similar organizations. The
conceptual model by Funic [Ref. 11] provided a view not only
of the elements involved in training, but also of some of the
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barriers and constraints that units must face in a peacetime
environment. The results of the Hayes et al.. Statistical
Model [Ref. 17] were valuable in that specific characteristics
were identified that led to success in actual combat engage-
ments. Finally the Sassone, Economic Training Model was pre-
sented [Ref. 39] which proposed some new thoughts on the sub-
ject of evaluating military training programs. The ideas brought




...studies have shown that accurate feedback about
quality of worlc is a strong stimulus to good perfor-
mance .. .People worlc better when they know how well
they are doing in relation to some meaningful standard.
[Ref. 43: p. 174]
This final section of the chapter will discuss feedback.
Feedback is variously described by different writers as feed-
back [Refs. 25,27,36,41], feedback control [Ref. 15], communi-
cations [Ref. 32] and further as dissemination, communications,
and utilization [Ref. 33]
.
Whatever the feedback is called it is common to all of
the models discussed. Feedback is a necessary part of all
evaluation systems.
Control to be effective, requires timely, accurate,
and dependable indicators of effectiveness. Feedback
should provide information that is adequate to suggest
appropriate action. To that end, reports must point
to significant developments, as distinguished from




Flamholtz [Ref. 43] has presented a typical model. Figure
3.7 of an organizational control system which places emphasis
on the feedback loop. He describes feedback as a necessary



































Source: Adopted from [Ref. 43: p. 56]
Figure 3.7. Model of Organizational Control System
This model provides a typical example of how the essential
feedback loop functions in an organizational control or eval-
uation system. The feedback loop provides an interactive
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process that allows for routine recycling of the results as
a comparison of the observed performance to the measurement
system. The essential element to observe here is that feed-
back is a standard fixture of the evaluation system. All
systems viewed that provide a diagrammatic model include a
feedback mechanism. In addition Anderson and Ball and the
ARTEP provided detailed structures for feedback.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has covered the topics of management, manage-
ment control, evaluation, and feedback. These topics can be
seen as moving from the general to the specific. The bound-
aries between these topics are not clear cut. There is a
great deal of overlap in the fields of management, organiza-
tional control, evaluation, and feedback. This is particularly
true when they are viewed from different disciplines. For
instance, much of what is classified in education as evaluation,
would be classified under control in organizational or mana-
gerial theory. A similar situation exists with regard to
terminology for feedback. Theorists in both the same and
different disciplines often use various terms to describe
feedback.
Since MCCRES attempts to measure or quantify readiness,
the military models were included. Although the last three
are static measures or prediction of effectiveness as opposed
to MCCRES and ARTEP which are dynamic measures, they do
provide insight into the various views of effectiveness and
the observations made from several different disciplines.
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Feedback was discussed with emphasis on relating the many
different terms used to describe feedback. In addition the
feedback loop which is common to all models reviewed has been
discussed. The theory of feedback is essential to this study
and the many ideas and structures placed on it will give much
insight when applied to MCCRES. Certain elements such as:
brevity and clarity, timeliness, interim products and re-
ports, and responsiveness [Ref. 33] have almost universal
application to feedback theory. The MBO , Evaluation and
Authority, Critical Incident, and ARTEP all provide a wealth
of insight on how feedback techniques should be applied.





In the last chapter detailed examination was made of
management control, four general evaluation systems, and four
specific evaluation systems which apply to the military. This
should provide the reader with a background from which to view
MCCRES. In this chapter attention is given in detail to the
MCCRES itself, its development, explanation of the system's
mission performance standards, and the evaluation process
applied by MCCRES as well as the reports and feedback designed
into the current system. The goal of this chapter is to pro-
vide the reader with a general understanding of how the MCCRES
is applied, based on the most current Marine Corps directives.
The purpose of the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evalua-
tion System (MCCRES) is to provide a timely and accurate
evaluation of readiness of Fleet Marine Forces, includ-
ing reserve units, to accomplish assigned missions.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-A-l]
The formal MCCRES must be given at least once every two years
for all FMF units for which performance standards have been
written.
A. DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE
The development of the MCCRES was begun with a review of
the various combat readiness measurements then currently in
use. Many of these consisted of individual, as well as unit,
evaluations and were in the form of inspections which stressed
appearance more than combat proficiency [Ref. 1].
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The MCCRES was structured to access the ability of all
Marine Corps Combat units: air and ground combat, combat
support, and combat service support. Specifically it was
designed to provide:
-Performance standards based on assigned missions
-A standardized evaluation process
-A standardized reporting system
-Feedback to units indicating strengths and weaknesses.
[Ref. 1: p. l-A-2]
The MCCRES was designed to provide a detailed analysis of
the units' operational capabilities and to specifically iden-
tify strengths and weaknesses through comparison with doctrine
under simulated combat conditions. The doctrine is embodied
in a checklist of requirements. The hierarchy of these quali-
ties is identified from general to specific as Mission Per-
formance Standards (MPS) , each of which consists of three
parts: Tasks, Conditions, and Requirements. The MPS set the
Commandant's acceptable standards for tactical performance
throughout the Marine Corps. Based on comparison of the
unit's performance to the MPS under simulated conditions, a
determination is made of "Combat Ready/Not Combat Ready."
The MCCRES is designed for both formal and informal evaluation.
The informal evaluation can be provided by the unit itself
measuring its performance standards. The formal evaluation is
accomplished by higher-level commands normally evaluating a
selection of MPS
. For the formal evaluation certain MPS
are required in all evaluations and others are selected by the
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organization directing the evaluation based on detailed
guidance in Ref. 1. A cross section of MPS's are used to
provide a statement of the organization's operational readiness
The evaluators employed in the formal system must be ex-
perienced, capable personnel. The overall system is designed
to identify specific operational deficiencies and the nature
of any latent or potential problems. The MCCRES cycle is des-



















Source: Adopted from [Ref. 1: p. I-A-6]
Figure 4.1. MCCRES Cycle
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B. MISSION PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (MPS)
In building the MCCRES framework it was decided that the
evaluation would be structured around a set of Mission Per-
formance Standards that establish, on a Marine Corps-wide
basis, acceptable operational performance. Derivation of these
standards was accomplished by using five interrelated concepts
concerning determination of combat readiness. The concepts
are:
- Standards must be objective
- Standards must define for the evaluator what quality means
- Standards must be based on published doctrine
- Standards must involve the performance of individual
Marines in evaluation of unit combat readiness
- Standards must be simple for the evaluator. [Ref . IJ
The MPS are defined in detail in Volumes II through VIII
of Marine Corps Order 3501.2. Each of these volumes pertains
to a specific type of unit to be evaluated, for instance
Volume II pertains to Infantry and Volume III to Rotary Wing
Observation Squadrons. In this way the volume lists the MPS's
involved for each unique type of unit.
Each MPS is further broken down into three major parts:
-"The Task to be performed
-The Condition under which the task is to be performed
-The Requirements which must be accomplished to successfully
fulfill the task." [Ref. 1: p. I-B4]
Examples of the MPS, Tasks, Conditions, and Requirements
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To assist the Evaluator when the Requirement does not
completely define the quality of performance necessary, Key
Indicators (KI) are provided. These KI's are defined to clarify
and explain the requirements [Ref. 1]. The Key Indicator (KI)
is further defined in Figure 4.3, Key Indicators for Evaluator.
For simplicity and to reduce the need for subjective judg-
ments, all MPS's were designed to permit the Evaluator only
three possible outcomes for each requirement: Yes/No/Not
Applicable. Those MPS's dealing with the performance of indi-
vidual Marines, Exercise of Command and Control, and Fire
Support Coordination must be used during every evaluation. The
reason that all MPS's are not employed during each evaluation
is a limitation of time and resources [Ref. 1].
In addition to the evaluation of MPS's which use a simu-
lated combat environment against an aggressor force, a series
of MCCRES Standard Performance Tests (SPTi have also been
developed. Examples of these types of proficiency tests are:
Foot Mobility Test, Dragon Gunner's Test, Engineer Route Recon-
naissance Test, and Aircraft Recognition Test. The SPT's are
used to support the MPS's and are tested objectively prior
to the MCCRES operational/readiness test. The SPT is formated
exactly as the MPS; however, a 'Yes' must be achieved in each
area before the MCCRES is continued. Any unit not found




KEY INDICATORS FOR EVALUATOR
WARNING ORDER
MUST INCLUDE:
General information on the situation.
Units to make the move and anticipated sequence.
Anticipated time of move.
Anticipated route and destination.
STAFF COORDINATION
MUST SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS:
Route reconnaissance—map, physical, or aerial photo.
Support needed from higher hq—air, vehicle, or firepower.
Fire support coverage throughout movement.
Cover and concealment available enroute.
Logistic aspects affected by location change.
BASIC PLAN
MUST BE BASED ON:
Movement at speed desired by higher hq.
Control of all elements during move.





Definition of all control measures to be used: check points,
phase lines, march objectives, etc.
Specific missions for attached and/or support elements:
tanks, engineers, TOW, etc.
Identification of initial point from which move will begin.




Clear identification of available outside support.
Detailed security procedures.
As much information on threat as is available:
Emphasis on specialized weaponry that can affect the
move; ATGM, artillery, air, etc.
Source: Adopted from [Ref. l.P: p. I-B-6J
Figure 4.3. Sample of Key Indicators for Evaluator
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C. PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT FOR THE EVALUATION
The key to successful application of each MCCRES is the
evaluation process. Selection and training of evaluators is
at the very heart of the evaluation process. Credibility of
the evaluators is essential to the success of MCCRES. The
evaluators selected are to have the requisite skills and recent
experience as to preclude the need for a long, detailed school
for the evaluators. However, as needed and as time allows,
training is provided to evaluators. Since all evluation sys-
tems require some judgment on the part of the evaluators, and
MCCRES is no exception, sound judgment is a prerequisite for
each evaluator chosen.
The evaluation is structured with the Commanding General's
Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) and Fleet Marine Force
Atlantic (FMFLANT) as the Evaluation/Exercise Commander (s)
(EC) for the initiation and conduct of all formal MCCRES
Evaluations . The responsibilities of the Evaluation/Exercise
Commanders are outlined in detail in Ref. 1.
1. Evaluation/Exercise Director (ED)
ED will be designated by the Exercise Commander (EC)
and is responsible to prepare for, conduct, and report the formal
MCCRES evaluations. Normally the Coramanging General of the
respective Marine Division or Wing whose subunit is to be
evaluated is designated ED.
2
.
Tactical Exercise Controller (TEC)
TEC will be designated by the ED, along with an ap-
pointed staff, to serve as the control agency for conducting
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the exercise. The TEC compiles and analyzes the results of
the evaluation. The TEC is also responsible for the detailed
training of the evaluators as well as development of a detailed
exercise scenario. At the end of the evaluation a formal re-
port is prepared for the ED describing the combat readiness
of the evaluated unit. A detailed critique should also be
conducted for all involved in the evaluation. In the critique
the results of the evaluated MPS are to be highlighted with




Evaluators should be prepared for the role through
successful past professional experiences as well as through
any detailed school provided. The MCCRES evaluators have
three roles: exercise controller, umpire, and performance
evaluator. As a performance evaluator, they apply the de-
tailed MPS ' s contained in the appropriate volume for the unit
and they are evaluating and actually make the 'Yes/No/Not
Applicable' determinations for individual tasks. The evalua-
tors must possess a complete and thorough understanding of
the Mission Performance Standards being evaluated. The evalu-
ators must make any notes needed on an Evaluator Work Sheet




Senior Evaluators will be determined by rank. Evalu-
ator for the unit evaluated compiles the data sheets from all
evaluators and should conduct a post exercise wrap up. Any
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questions or conflicts should be resolved at that time. The
process must result in the senior evaluator being assured that
his data provides an accurate reflection of the overall unit
performance. The senior evaluator then makes the determina-
tion of the overall unit evaluation of "Combat Ready/Not
Combat Ready". The senior evaluator provides the data sheets
to TEC who compiles the detailed analysis and presents it to
the evaluation/exercise director [Ref. 1].
5 . Evaluation Staffing
Evaluation Staffing is the responsibility of the ED
for both selecting and training all evaluators prior to a
MCCRES . It is desirable to obtain evaluators from adjacent com-
mands, not directly related to the organization being evaluated,
D. COMPUTER ADAPTED MCCRES
The Marine Corps Combat Readiness System Software Applica-
tion (MCCRESSA) , is designed to furnish all organizations in-
volved with MCCRES a means of assessing and analyzing data
pertaining to MCCRES evaluations. Specifically it provides
the following:
A list of mission performance standards, tasks, and
requirements
.
...the chief evaluator with a rapid overview and selected
analysis of the units evaluation.
Identifies unit readiness based upon mission performance
standards tested within the applied scenario.
Provides unit commanders a list of unit readiness deficien-




Reviews unit evaluations to determine validity of mission
performance standards and doctrine.
Reviews unit's evaluations to determine limitation/inade-
quacies in officer education programs. [Ref. 1: p. I-E2]
All of the formal evaluation reports are input to the Head-
quarters Marine Corps data base [Ref. 1]
.
E. REPORTS
At the end of a MCCRES , after the Evaluator Data Sheets
have been compiled for all units evaluated, the TEC and senior
evaluators should review the sheets and make a determination
of "Combat Ready/Not Combat Ready" for each unit evaluated.
This recommendation is based on an initial review of "Yes's/
No • s" for all requirements, taking into account any tasks or
MPS ' s that were "demand elements that must be judged Yes for
an overall 'Combat Ready* evaluation to be given."
1 . Feedback
"The primary purpose of MCCRES reports is to provide
the feedback necessary for commanders to initiate corrective
action that will im.prove combat readiness" [Ref. 1: p. 1-DlJ .
The results should be reflected in improved training
objectives and may also affect resource allocation of per-
sonnel, equipment, or logistics support. To assist in the
reallocation of critical resources, a detailed report is pro-
vided through the chain of command to the unit evaluated.
This report provides a short subjective comment as well as
percentile scores and weighting for each Section, MPS, Task,
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and Requirement evaluated. (See Appendix A—Sample MCCRESSA
printout for one MPS
.
)
Additionally a report is provided in message format
to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) within 10 days
following the end of an evaluation indicating the overall
evaluation "Combat Ready/Not. Combat Ready" and unit identifi-
cation. Within 30 days a detailed report of the MCCRESSA
printout is provided to the CMC. The report should include
comments or recommendations for improvement or revisions to
the MCCRES. The purpose of the follow up report is to allow
CMC to; provide assistance in the review of doctrine, tactics,
techniques, education and training programs, and validation
of MCCRES elements. This report also serves to highlight
trends and repeated deficiencies, and permit analysis for
corrective action to take place [Ref . Ij .
2 . Policy
Based on Marine Corps policy, MCCRES reports are not
designed to be used to compare the combat readiness of various
units. This is a result of differences in unit type, services,
environmental conditions, and resource allocations. The
evaluation indexes on MCCRES reports are provided to indicate
an approximate status of the unit's combat readiness during
a particular evaluation [Ref. 1]. It can be said that the





This chapter presented an overview of the MCCRES including
a discussion of the Development and Structure, Mission Per-
formance Standards, Personnel Assignment for the Evaluation,
Computer Adapted MCCRES and Reports . The purpose was to
provide the reader with a general background of how the
MCCRES is intended to be implemented throughout the Marine
Corps, based on systems design and policies.
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V. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The research method used had three distinct phases. First
a general literature review was conducted. Second a specific
literature review of MCCRES and related defense publications
was undertaken. Third a detailed field study was made to
obtain first hand information from those involved with the
development, application, and oversite of MCCRES.
A. AUDIENCE
Anderson and Ball specified in their findings [Ref. 36]
of the importance of identifying the audience when researching
and distributing results. To this end the primary audience
for this study are the planners who conduct periodic reviews
and revisions of MCCRES doctrine, that is, the Readiness Branch
at HQMC. Additionally the audience should include all those
involved with MCCRES or who will be involved with MCCRES, as
well as commanders, evaluators, planners in organizations and
others who would benefit from understanding the findings pre-
sented herein.
B. GENERAL LITERATURE REVIEW
The results of the general literature review are presented
in Chapter III. A background in management control, general
evaluation systems as well as specific examples applied to
the military from various disciplines is necessary to gain
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insights into MCCRES . It is evident from Chapter IV that
MCCRES has incorporated into it many of the positive aspects
of general evaluation systems theory [Refs. 5,6,20,25,26,
32,33]
.
C. SPECIFIC LITERATURE REVIEW
The specific literature review consisted of articles on
MCCRES appearing in the various defense publications [Refs. 2,
6,10,13,31,37, and 38] as well as the technical reports and
articles available on MCCRES and other military training and
readiness evaluation systems [Refs. 4,7,11,12,17,38]. This
specific literature review not only provided a basis for
understanding the MCCRES from the standpoint of its proponents
and detractors, but it also provided some valuable ideas on
alternatives to MCCRES. The detailed technical reports made
available by George Washington University were invaluable in




The field study was conducted to obtain first hand infor-
mation on MCCRES. Personal interviews, telephone interviews,
and a visit to the Readiness Branch HQMC, George Washington
University, and to the Army's 7th Infantry Division were em-
ployed to that end. The interviews were semi-structured. The
stated purpose of the interviews was not just to answer the
specific questions posed, but to stimulate thought and identify
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as many ideas as possible on how the MCCPIES could be improved.
Although the scope of this project was limited by its primary
emphasis on feedback, other valuable information was elicited.
1. Sample
The sample group chosen consisted of those who had
the most experience and most vested interest in the MCCRES
feedback. Because the MCCRES evaluations are most often
given to infantry battalions and aviation squadrons, these
were identified as the primary target group. Battalion and
squadron commanders, senior evaluators, and division/squadron
MCCRES officers were identified as the primary sources of
information since they have the most detailed involvement with
the MCCRES feedback. Upon interviewing the sample it was also
found that many of the officers had been involved in several
MCCRES ' s and in different capacities. Thus many had experi-
ence as both a senior evaluator and a battalion or squadron
commander of an evaluated unit. Divisional or squadron MCCRES
officers were also a rich source of information because of
their daily involvement with MCCRES. The secondary source of
information were "others involved with MCCRES." This group
is composed of members of evaluated units other than the
unit commanders, such as unit operations officer, officers in-
volved with subunits evaluated, and company commanders. They
also provided much information.
Given the sample identified, the field study, there-
fore, concentrated on those of rank from captain to colonel
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in the military occupational f ielc3s of infantry, aviation
(fixed wing and helicopters), tanks, artillery, engineer,
and air control. A total of 37 individuals were interviewed,
The sample group is presented by rank and occupational field
below in Table 5.1.
TABLE 5.1
Rank/Occupational Field Sample Distribution
OCOJP
RANK

















Lt. Colonel 10 3 3 1 • 1 1
Major 3 4 3 10







These officers are currently serving in billets throughout
the Marine Corps, representing all divisions and wings, as
well as the 1st Marine Brigade in Hawaii. Other active duty
officers serving in billets at Headquarters Marine Corps,
Naval Postgraduate School, and with the reserve establishment
were also interviewed.
2 , Interview Techniques
All those interviewed were asked a standard set of
open-ended questions [Ref. 45]. These questions were
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purposefully left broad and open-ended to solicit as many
ideas and opinions as possible. Each interview was conducted
in person or by telephone by this researcher. All interview
results were recorded on an answer form and interviewers were
taped after the permission of the respondent was given. When
a respondent was uncertain or uncomfortable in answering a
question, he was asked to skip over it. However, no attempt
was made to limit the respondent to any set of prearranged
answers. In all cases, where answer choices were posed,
an invitation for "other ideas or suggestions" was
always made. As the interviews progressed, the questions were
refined to help the interviewee narrow in on the specific
area being researched.
3. Questions Posed
The following set of questions was posed to all those
interviewed:
(1) When the computerized data results from a MCCRES are
provided to the evaluated unit, what uses are made of
that data?
(2) Do you feel that information/data provided to the
evaluated unit as the result of a MCCRES are satisfac-
tory for the purpose of initiating corrective action
that will improve combat readiness?
(3) Is the current procedure of providing the results as
a computer printout based on the evaluation of the
Sections, MPS, Tasks, and Requirements the most
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effective format for displaying the results to the
evaluated unit commander?
(4) Does the format lend itself to a complete understanding
of how the unit performed compared with MCCRES criteria?
(5) Do Marine Corps Directives provide sufficient guidance
for interpretation of results?
(6) Would it be helpful to know how your unit performed on
a Section/MPS/Task/Requirement as compared with other
units? Example: Your infantry battalion scored a
73% on the MPS, "Command and Control Operations."
This compares with a median of 68% for all other infantry
units and 71% for all units evaluated.
(7) What do you feel is the most effective forum for pro-
viding MCCRES results to the unit tested?
a. Oral debrief at end of .exercise
b. Written debrief at end of exercise
c. Progressive oral debrief throughout the exercise
d. Combination of a-c above
e. Some other method than those suggested
(8) Who should be made aware of the MCCRES results?
a. Chain of command
b. Other like-units (infantry, air, artillery, etc.)
c. All Marine Corps units
4 . Background Visits
Additionally visits were made to Headquarters Marine
Corps (HQMC) , Readiness Branch, George Washington University
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and to the Army's 7th Infantry Division, Fort Ord, California.
Individuals interviewed during these visits provided many
valuable insights into the development and overseeing of
MCCRES, as well as a detailed understanding of how the Army
ARTEP system is employed. Several of the individuals inter-
viewed were involved in the early development of the MCCRES
:
Professor W. H. Marlowe, George Washington University; Lt
.
Colonel Paul Catalone, USMC, and Colonel M. P. Sullivan, USMC
(telephone interview), and Lt. Colonel R. S. Gibson, USMC
(telephone interview)
.
E. CONTENT ANALYSIS/DATA REVIEW
Since the material/responses to the questions asked were
subjective in nature, content analysis was used to analyze
the results [Ref. 46].
1. Content Analysis Defined
Berelson states: "Systematic content analysis attempts
to define casual descriptions of the content, so as to show
objectively the nature and relative strength of the stimuli
applied to the reader or listener" [Ref. 46: p. 14].
This procedure is employed by constructing an analysis
outline which described by Cartwright embodies the following
general principles:
Step 1—specify data needs,
Step 2—map out plans for tabulation.
Step 3—map a skeleton of the outline.
Step 4--fill in categories for each variable.
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step 5—establish procedures for using the material.
Step 6—try out the analysis outline and use procedure-
[Ref. 45: pp. 454-460]
The application of content analysis allows the researcher
to study the communications and focus on the interaction through
messages which link communicating parties. Not all signifi-
cance can be extracted by inspection or mere observation.
The real purpose of any analysis is to illuminate and make
inferences about something that is not otherwise apparent.
Thus the process of content analysis is a process like the
congruence definition of evaluation which employs objectives
and criteria in developing a measurement process which is
both scientific and objective. The process is not, however,
totally devoid of judgment and does allow the researcher dis-
cretion in categorizing results [Ref . 47]
.
2 . Analysis of Specific Responses to Questions
The purpose of content analysis is to provide some
means of quantifying subjective information. To accomplish
this rules must be established. The data contained in the
response to each of the eight questions was treated as a
separate unit and no attempt was made during the interview to
relate any answers from one question to that of another. This
procedure was used to solicit as much information possible and
so as not to limit any of the respondents in their comments.
Since each question stood alone and was relatively subjective
in nature, each question provided an opportunity for a response
to contain similar information in response to different
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questions. Thus once a respondent began to provide information
to a question which was more appropriately categorized as a
response to a different question, the interviewer simply re-
corded the information under the question currently being
asked. However as part of the analysis of the interviews,
responses to one question that were relevant to other questions
were considered.
Each question had certain categories set up for the
responses and each response made was placed in one of these
categories. In order to generate useful information from con-
tent analysis, the categories must be collectively exhaustive
and mutually exclusive. For example:
Question #1—When the computerized data results from a MCCRES
are provided to the evaluated unit, what uses are made of
that data?
Responses to this question fell into three groupings:
"none"
"used for planning future training and resource allocation"
"historical reference only"
It should be understood that each MCCRES has many key
participants and each has a different involvement in the
evaluation. Some such as the unit commander and senior evalu-
ator are involved virtually in all aspects. Others such as
the operations officers and operations evaluators have a more
limited focus in their responsibilities. Thus a system was
developed to give varying weight to those who had differing
levels of involvement with MCCRES.
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High Intensity—those involved directly in one or more
MCCRES as unit commander, division or
wing MCCRES officer, senior evaluator.
Medium Intensity—those involved with less direct
responsibility for results: operations
officers, other evaluators, company
commanders, etc.
Low Intensity—Employed in only one case where interviewee
was involved in a forerunner evaluation to
MCCRES
3 . Analysis of General Responses to Questions
To determine which question responses should be dis-
played for the reader, a 10% rule was formulated. If 10% or
more of the respondents to a question amplified their specific
answer with similar comments or suggestions, then the comments
were included. Thus, any of the general responses included
in the next chapter were mentioned by four or more of those
sampled.
F. SUMMARY
In this chapter the research method is summarized. A
total of 3 7 Marine officers were interviewed. Although the
number is relatively small, it should be remembered that the
Marine Corps has three infantry divisions and three aircraft
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wings on active duty. Therefore, the total population of those
qualified to answer the questions is drawn from a limited
population of officers in the target group. It is hard to
estimate the total number of officers that have been involved
in these primary capacities since the billet holders rotate
regularly; but it is safe to say that only a few hundred offi-
cers have served as battalion/squadron couimanders or senior
evaluators of evaluated units. Since the MCCRES is only re-





This chapter presents the detailed analysis of the results
obtained through the field study. The specific and general
responses to questions posed were content analyzed. The basis
for this type of analysis is provided by Berelson [Ref . 46]
.
Percentages derived from the content analysis are the
weighted averages of the points for each category as compared
with total points for each question. The responses are weighted
based upon the level of involvement of the respondent in previ-
ous MCCRES ' s . In cases where some interviewees did not answer
a certain question, the percentage is based only on the re-
sults of those who did answer. No attempt was made to cate-
gorize reasons why those that failed to respond did so.
A. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
First Question: (1) When the computerized data results
from a MCCRES are provided to the evaluated unit, what uses
are made of that data?
Responses to this question were grouped into three categories-
None, Used for planning, and Historical reference only—and are
shown in Table 6.1. The majority of the respondents (63.6%).
said that the results of MCCRES were used for planning future
training or specifically for future resource allocation.
Second Questions: (2) Do you feel that information/data
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satisfactory for the purpose of initiating corrective action
that will improve combat readiness?
The responses to this question are categorized as positive
or negative and are shown in Table 6.2. The majority of the
respondents (81.3%) said that the information/data provided
from a MCCRES is satisfactory for initiating corrective action
that will improve combat readiness.
Third Question: (3) Is the current procedure of provid-
ing the results as a computer printout based on the results
of Sections, MPS, Tasks, and Requirements, the most effective
format for displaying the results to the evaluated unit?
The responses to this question were categorized as posi-
tive or negative. As shown by Table 6.3, 64.6% of the
respondents said that the current procedure of providing the
results as a computer printout was not the most effective
format for displaying the results to the evaluated unit.
Fourth Question: (4) Does the format lend itself to a
complete understanding of how the unit performed compared with
MCCRES criteria?
The response to this question was categorized as positive
or negative. As shown in Table 6.4, 5 5.6% of the respondents
said that the current format lends itself to a complete under-
standing of how the unit compared with MCCRES criteria.
Fifth Question: (5) Do Marine Corps Directives provide
sufficient guidance for interpretation of results?
The responses to this question were categorized as posi-






























































































































































































































































































respondents said that Marine Corps Directives provide suffi-
cient guidance for interpretation of results.
Sixth Question: (6) Would it be helpful to know how your
unit performed on a Section/MPS/Task/Requirement as compared
with other units? Example: Your infantry battalion scored
a 73% on the MPS, "Command and Control Operations." This
compares with a median of 68% for all other infantry units
and 71% for all units tested.
The responses to this question were categorized as posi-
tive or negative. As shown by Table 6.6, 55.4% of the respondents
said that it would be helpful to know how their unit performed
on a Section/MPS/Task/Requirement as compared with other units.
Seventh Question: (7) What do you feel is the most
effective forum for providing MCCRES results to the unit?
This question was evaluated based on selection of one of
five responses: oral debrief at end of exercise, written at
end, progressive; combination of above; or other. As indicated
in Table 6.7, all thirty-seven interviewees responded to the
question. Of the total, 91.5% responded that a combination
of oral and written debriefs is the most effective forum for
providing MCCRES results to the unit evaluated.
Eighth Question: (8) Who should be made aware of MCCRES
results?
The question was evaluated based on selection of one of
three responses: chain of command, other like units, or all
units. As indicated in Table 6.8, 60.2% of the respondents
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The responses to the questions are summarized for the
reader in Tables 6.9 and 6.10. Table 6.9 shows the distribu-
tion by rank of the specific responses to the eight questions.
Table 6.10 shows the distribution by community (ground/air).
A more detailed display of data by occupational specialty was
available to the researcher; however, to protect the anony-
mity of the respondents only the general categorizations of
answers is displayed. In reviewing the data in Tables 6.9
and 6.10 there is no direct evidence of bias by any specific
rank or community. This same result was true when evaluating
the data by occupational specialty.
B. ANALYSIS OF GENERAL RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
The primary purpose of this research was to gain insight
and new ideas. To this end the respondents were specifically
asked to expand upon and explain their answers. Their explana-
tions resulted in the following information. The 10% decision
rule discussed above was used to determine which information
to present.
In response to Question One, the majority of the inter-
viewees said that the results from a MCCRES found their way
into unit training plans and schedules. One of the most serious
concerns brought out in response to this question concerned
timing [Ref. 20] of the evaluation. If the MCCRES is given
sixty days or more prior to deployment then the unit may
experience substantial turnover of key personnel and nullify




Distribution by Rank of Responses to Questions
Question # Colonel Lt. Colonel Major Captain TOTAL
1. a. None 4 1 5
b. Planning 4 11 4 3 22
c. Historical 3 4 7
2. a. Positive 3 16 7 3 29
b. Negative 4 2 6
3. a. Positive 1 7 2 1 U
b. Negative 2 11 6 19
4. a. Positive 3 8 3 1 15
b. Negative 9 3 12
5. a. Positive 2 12 6 20
b. Negative 5 1 1 7
6. a. Positive 3 10 7 1 21
b. Negative 1 9 4 1 15
7. a. Oral
b. Written 1 1
c. Progressive 2 2
d. Combination 4 17 10 3 34
e. Other
8. a. Chain 1 7 2 1 11
b. Like 1 2 1 4

























KEY: Ground: Infantry, Tanks, Artillery, Engineer








2. a. Positive 21
b. Negative 1
3. a. Positive 7
b. Negative 11
4. a. Positive 9
b. Negative 6
5. a. Positive 12
b. Negative 3












alternative of this presents a serious dileirana. If the MCCRES
is given too close to time of deployment, then little time
exists to correct all but the most glaring deficiencies.
Additionally since no real second evaluation is made of the
shortcomings, the USMC may be deploying units who have not
in fact corrected shortcomings identified during MCCRES.
A second major problem identified by the respondents is
the timeliness with which the unit gets the actual MCCRES re-
port. Some organizations present at least a rough of the
printout to the unit at the time of the formal debrief, usually
12-24 hours after termination of the MCCRES. Others do not
receive their formal printout until there is a complete staffing
by division/wing, regiment/group; and in at least two cases
the unit did not receive their formal feedback until they were
on their deployment. One unit did not see their printout at
all after the MCCRES. (This comment is provided as an exception
to the 10% rule because of the seriousness of this situation.)
Responses to Question Two indicated that the current
MCCRES gives sufficient information to improve combat readi-
ness. In the case of the rotoiywing MCCRES, three of the six
rotorywing respondents indicated that more weight was needed
on flying skills than is currently given by the MPS in Volume
III. Generally the responses from the rotor wing community
indicated too much emphasis is given to non-flight requirements
and too little to flight skills. In addition responses from
the fixed-wing community indicated that technology is changing
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more rapidly than the MCCRES . With the implementation of the
FA-18 aircraft and changes to other aircraft, the MCCRES
evaluation needs to be changed to be current and realistic.
In other words the aircraft can do a lot more than MCCRES re-
quires. Discussions with the Readiness Branch indicate they
are well aware of the problems caused by changing technology
in the FA-18 and other new aircraft, and are presently improv-
ing the MCCRES requirements to test the aircraft at limits
that more closely approximate its actual capabilities rather
than against the less demanding F-4 Requirements.
A total of 13 respondents commented that MCCRES results are
only as credible as the evaluators. The absence of standardi-
zation of evaluators and evaluator training, as well as the
variances in how organizations pick evaluators had a great
impact on the value perceptions and the worth of the MCCRES
as a measure of the unit's readiness. This was expressed by
six of the fifteen officers in the aviation community. Forty
percent of the respondents submitted an unsolicited comment on
the quality of the evaluators. If the evaluator is not re-
garded as highly qualified by his peers, then the evaluation
is regarded with little weight. The question of evaluator
bias is discussed in more depth by Wheeler [Ref. 5].
A final problem cited dealt with the MCCRES concept of
comparing unit performance with published combat doctrine.
Doctrine as codified in written manuals may be outdated. If
so, the USMC is evaluating units by comparing their performance
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to standards which would not be employed on the modern battle-
field. An example af this cited by four infantry commanders
is "maneuver warfare". Maneuver warfare is widely accepted
by Western military analysts as the most promising way to
fight and win any future war against Soviet tactics. However,
maneuver warfare is not written into current Marine Corps
doctrinal publications. This shortfall points out the need
for distribution of MCCRES results to all training and doctrine
commands to ensure they are aware of the strengths and short-
falls that units/individuals display on MCCRES.
The most common response to Question Three was negative.
A percentage of 64.6% of the respondents said that they did
not feel the computerized printout is the best way to dis-
play MCCRES results. Nineteen of thirty respondents indicated
more subjective data was needed to fully understand the units'
evaluations and to be able to take corrective actions. The
computer printout provides a "Yes/No" evaluation, but it fails
to provide the "why" and "what" [Ref . 36] . More details are
needed to describe specific reasons for "No" marks and recom-
mendations are necessary to help the unit find ways to improve.
All those responding negatively C19 of the 30 respondents)
indicated it was much more valuable to spell out the details
of a shortfall and to suggest corrective action, than to simply
provide a "Yes/No" on an evaluation sheet. Several innovative
ideas have come out of this problem. One wing MCCRES officer
now writes all comments directly on the MCCRES printout before
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it is provided to the unit. The wing MCCRES officer said
this facilitates a much more complete understanding of problem
areas. The general concensus of the 30 respondents to this
question was that the subjective, explanatory information is
by far the most valuable to the evaluated unit and the per-
centile scores on the printout are probably of greater value
to higher level headquarters for use in planning future training.
In response to Question Four, 15 of the 27 respondents or
55.6% agreed that the current format is not difficult to under-
stand. In general those who indicated a willingness to refer-
ence the' directives and compare the printout to the appropri-
ate Volume were satisfied with the explanations provided
therein. Those who said the current format is difficult to
understand (12 of the 27 or 44.4%) did so based on a criterion
of the inconvenience of the system, that is requiring both
the printout and the Volume. This requires a good bit of
tedious research to find the details of each MPS/Task/Require-
ment. The recent addition of a description of each MPS/Task/
Requirement on the MCCRES printout should help reduce this
problem. On the other hand, the brief description may cause
even less referencing of the source document to obtain complete
details. One suggestion was that key players from the unit to be
evaluated should be given detailed classes and instructions on
the MPS several weeks prior to a scheduled MCCRES. This has
recently been started in one wing and the results are excellent.
This contention was supported by both squadron commanders
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questioned as well as by those in the Readiness Branch at
Headquarters Marine Corps. Just as there is a need to edu-
cate evaluators, there is also a need to educate those to be
evaluated [Refs. 5,25,26].
An added point made by five unit commanders was that the
results must get out to all those concerned. If the response
to an evaluation is delayed or the results simply become his-
torical record, those who need to know at company, platoon,
and squad level are never made aware of the results. Much
emphasis is needed on informing all participants down to the
individual Marine of the results of MCCRES [Refs. 15,37].
MCCRES results should be distributed to all detachments to
ensure they know how their performance was evaluated.
Responses to Question Five indicated that the orders gener-
ally seem well written and easy to interpret. The same sugges-
tion for education made on Question Four applies here. That
is, any instruction given to key unit players will result in
better overall understanding of MCCRES and allows the unit
to better use the results.
Several specific shortcomings in MCCRES were also noted
in response to Question Five. Those relating to aviation were
addressed under Question Two. One infantry division has found
some serious shortcomings, specifically in the failure to pro-
vide for intelligence gathering, fire support coordination,
and allocation of tasks from higher headquarters. These three





Question Six by far evoked the most emotional and intense
responses. Any time a comparative index is proposed it has
the potential for both good and bad results depending on its
use. Of 37 individuals interviewed, 55.4% favored some sort
of use of comparative scores. Those opposed tended to do so
based on the view that any comparison of scores provided a
potential for use as a report card to compare units and
specifically unit commanders. The primary objections to the
use of comparative scores was based on the lack of overall
standardization within MCCRES , especially the differences in
evaluators, scenarios, terrain, and weather conditions.
Those who favored comparative scoring did so for various
reasons. Four respondents thought comparative scoring had
value, but only for higher headquarters, training, and doc-
trine commands. Seven others thought comparative scoring had
value if shown to the unit in complete privacy. A final segment
of ten respondents indicated that the comparative scoring had
potential to crea^te more unit competition. Thus, overall, only
10 out of the 37 respondents supported any sort of mass publica-
tion of comparative scores.
The results to Question Seven provided evidence that feed-
back must be provided in various forms throughout the exercise
to be most effective. As seen in response to Question Three,
64.6% wanted more subjective feedback. In Question Seven
that was reaffirmed. The respondents said that by far the most
valuable feedback was obtained from verbal, subjective critiques
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given immediately after an event has taken place.
A total of 91.5% of the respondents indicated a combination
of debriefs and written results is most desirable. The written
results should not only include the objective numerical re-
sults of "Yes/No" markings, but also explanation of all the
"No/N.A." markings.
Question Eight was most often answered with "all units,"
60.2% of the time. The specific point made here was that the
chain of command has an obvious need to know the results.
All units could benefit from a generic trend analysis report.
Trend analysis would provide a cross pollination of critical
information throughout the Marine Corps and assist those in-
volved in developing training and doctrine. Those favoring
"all units" or "other like units" comprised a total percentage
of 69.3%, provided a favorable response to the suggestio-n of
receiving a generic trend analysis at regular intervals from
the MCCRES Data Bank. The fact that no respondent provided
any objection to this idea is indicative of its positive
value.
C . SUMMARY
As can be seen in the next chapter the analysis of specific
and general responses to the eight questions provided answers
to the research questions posed by this thesis. In addition
a number of important unsolicited comments, outside the scope
of this study, were also obtained. These comments are pre-




VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
A. ANSWERS TO PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The results of the research have provided answers to ques-
tions posed at the beginning of this project. The three
primary research questions were:
(1) After MCCRES , what information should be fed back
to the evaluated unit commander?
(2) In what form should the evaluation feedback be?
(3) What channel (s) should be used to provide the
feedback to the evaluated unit?
A comprehensive feedback model is presented which incorporates
the results for the three questions.
It was evident throughout this study that the unit com-
mander faces many constraints: training time, material,
equipment, logistics, and personnel. The information from
MCCRES should be provided in such a way as to allow for
better allocation of these scarce resources to the unit.
As discussed in Chapter II, the overall goal of the MCCRES
is not only to provide a measure of unit readiness, but to
provide effective feedback to the organization to enhance the
opportunities to improve readiness by applying resources to
areas identified as deficient by MCCRES. The theories under-
lying management control and evaluation, as presented in
116

Chapter 111, provide a rich background for understanding how
to perforin the MCCRES evaluation and how to effectively use
the results of an evaluation. In both theoretical and applied
models of evaluation, information and feedback play an impor-
tant role in both performing and using the results of an
evaluation. In general the m.odels of evaluation have common
desirable characteristics such as: brevity, clarity, timeli-
ness, interim products and reports, and responsiveness of
feedback [Ref . 33] .
Additionally/ characteristics of the organizational control
system [Ref. 43] such as goals, standards, measurement system,
evaluation and reward system as well as the feedback loop play
an equally important role in the evaluation models [Refs. 30,
32,33,35, and 38]
.
Based upon these findings and the results of a field study,
a model for MCCRES feedback was developed. The model is pre-
sented in Figure 7.1. Each of the eight major elements of the










Figure 7.1. Model of MCCRES Feedback to an Evaluated Unit

1. Pre-MCCRES Briefing
A detailed orientation several weeks prior to MCCRES
to provide a firm foundation for all key personnel. Explana-
tion of appropriate Volumes of MCO 3501.2. Explanation of
the details of each MPS and procedures for the evaluator
allows the unit to maximize the potential from the MCCRES
feedback [Ref. 36].
2. Real Time Feedback
Regular verbal feedback throughout the exercise by
evaluators at each level. At any logical break in the scenario
detailed evaluations of the most recent events should be pro-
vided by the evaluators. This provides data while the event
is fresh in everyone's minds [Ref. 33].
3. Evaluator Worksheets
The Evaluator Worksheets should be provided directly
to the evaluated element shortly after conclusion of the
exercise. This provides an interim evaluation report and
allows for maximum feedback to the specific element evaluated.
It would be especially valuable to subunits and attachments




At the end of exercise, twelve to twenty-four hours
after the end of the formal MCCRES, a detailed debrief should
be held for evaluators and key players from the unit evaluated.
Opportunities should be given for two-way discussion to resolve
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any confusion or disagreement particularly regarding subjec-
tive areas. The individuals from the evaluated unit should
leave with not only a clear understanding of the deficiencies,
but also with a clear understanding of what caused the "No"
evaluations and suggestions for improvement [Ref. 33]. Since
the commander of the unit evaluated is responsible for the
employment of the feedback, he should have the flexibility
to tailor the debrief to his leadership style. The commander
may desire to have only a few selected evaluators and officers
present or the unit commander may desire all evaluators and
unit officers to be present.
5. Computerized MCCRES Printout
The computerized MCCRES printout with percentile scores
and detailed amplifying remarks should be provided to the
unit in a timely manner [Ref. 33]. It does a unit little good
to get the detailed results when there is no time to correct
deficiencies. What is timely can vary depending on deployment
schedules, but getting a copy of the results in the hands of
the evaluated unit so that action can be taken is essential.
It is inexcusable to allow staffing to delay this critical
information. Delays also put the unit further away from the
MCCRES and it tends to become an historical document vice a




The data needed to compare units within a division or
wing is currently available with limited research within the
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division or wing files. Additionally most division or wing
headquarters are well aware of how their scores compare with
other like units. Usage of general MCCRES data bank to provide
comparative scores, medians, and standard deviations should be
provided to major headquarters staff, training, and doctrine
commands for the limited purpose of planning future resource
allocation and to develop training doctrine. These compara-
tive results should be limited to Section/MPS/Task scores and
should not include any sort of comparative final score for
the units as a whole. Providing any sort of overall scores
that could be used to compare individual units tested could
well have a negative impact because of the many variances in
evaluation conditions that exist. It is further recommended
that these comparative results be directed only at division/
wing level or higher commands to reduce the chance of any
type of unit comparisons.
An example of comparative percentile results that could
be provided to division/wing level for use in planning future
training is presented in Figure 7.2.
PAST SIX MONTH MCCRES RESULTS
Division/ Overall
Wing Marine Corps
Section 2.0 Operations Performed
MPS 2. A Actions by Marines
Task 2.A.1 Discipline








Currently no follow up evaluation is made to con-
firm that the deficiencies have been corrected. Some type of
final check is needed. This check would best be accomplished
with little formality. Since the unit commander has the
responsibility for application of MCCRES feedback to improve
unit readiness, it is best left to the unit commander to do
the final check which certifies that deficiencies have been
corrected. Resource reallocation from outside the evaluated
unit likewise should be certified at the appropriate level.
The key issue here is that the unit must be deployed at the
highest level of combat readiness and verification of correc-
tion of MCCRES deficiencies at least on an informal basis is
essential. This follow-up should be made as simply as possi-
ble. The unit commander can appropriately perform this certi-
fication based on his own experience and judgment. A formal
follow-up inspection is neither necessary nor desirable.
8. Trend Analysis
To gain a higher level of across-the-board readiness,
a trend analysis would be of value to all units. The MCCRES
data base represents a resource that could be used to keep the
Marine Corps informed of its overall strengths and weaknesses.
Special emphasis should be made on getting these results





B. ANSWERS TO SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The results of the research provided answers to the second-
ary research questions posed at the beginning of the project.
The three secondary research questions were:
(1) Validity of comparing MCCRES results given under
differing conditions.
(2) MCCRES contribution to effective training,
(3) Time availability and follow up to ensure correction
of deficiencies identified during MCCRES.
A first response to the question of the validity of com-
paring MCCRES results given under differing conditions might
be to say that such comparisons can only be made if complete
standardization is achieved. Although complete standardiza-
tion for purposes of evaluation may seem to be desirable, this
may not be feasible. Since various Marine Corps units (east
coast, west coast, overseas) are preparing for different mis-
sions, it is desirable to simulate their expected combat
employment through the use of different scenarios, terrain,
and even MPS's. Additionally the Marine Corps has other exer-
cises, such as the Combined Arms Exercise or CAC ' s , which are
used to evaluate under standard scenario, terrain, and evalua-
tors , but they have a more limited purpose than MCCRES. Be-
cause of the broader purposes of MCCRES, complete standardization
is probably not desirable. In addition it can be questioned
as to how much standardization is really necessary to have an
effective evaluation system. The performance evaluation system
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used for promotions is one familiar to all Marine officers.
It can be argued that the MCCRES certainly has much more
objectivity than the Performance Evaluation System [Ref . 47]
.
Thus for its intended purpose, MCCRES appears to provide a
relatively high degree of objectivity when compared with other
military systems and the results are likely to be useful, at
least for generic comparisons and to identify trends.
In response to the question of MCCRES ' s contribution to
effective training, it is evident from the data gathered for
this thesis that MCCRES has the potential to, and currently
does, improve unit training. Many units train to MCCRES
standards and go so far as to use actual MCCRES Section/MPS/
Task/Requirements to structure their unit training. There-
fore as the Individual Training Standards CITS) are developed
for all units, it is essential that they be closely compared
with MCCRES standards so that the training and evaluation
development move in the same direction [Refs. 5,28,29].
The third question, time availability to correct MCCRES
deficiencies, has previously been discussed. No doubt more
time would allow for more training in deficient areas. How-
ever, the question of follow up is also critical. At least
an informal re-validation of deficient areas is needed to
ensure the effectiveness of the MCCRES.
C. SUMMARY
This research has provided detailed answers to the ques-
tions posed at the beginning of the study. The feedback to
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the unit is the key element to making the MCCRES of value to
the unit evaluated. The purpose of MCCRES is to provide timely
and accurate evaluation of the force readiness. Key to im-
proving readiness is identification of strengths and weaknesses,
and providing timely and thorough feedback to the evaluated
unit and its chain of command. The more timely and thorough
the feedback, the higher the likelihood of improved future
readiness. The MCCRES is currently viewed as a sound, valua-
ble evaluation system. However, as this thesis has demon-
strated, the feedback to the units can be improved.
D. STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS
The feedback model developed and displayed as Figure 7.1
should be incorporated as the minimum acceptable procedure
for providing feedback from any MCCRES. To accomplish this
the eight steps in the feedback model should be followed during
each evaluation. The following information should be routinely
provided as feedback.
Pre-MCCRES Briefing—to key MCCRES players from the evaluated
unit
Real Time Feedback—distributed to all those evaluated
Two-way Debrief at end of exercise— tailored to needs of




provided in a timely manner
to allow new resource allocation prior to deployment
Comparative Percentile Results--to help direct unit train-
ing and for incorporation by individual training and
doctrine commands
Follow-up Report--done informally by unit commander to




Trend Analysis--to support future training as well as
changes in doctrine.
Implementation of these recommendations would suit the
stated needs of fleet units as well as serve the intended
MCCRES purpose of providing an evaluation of unit readiness
to higher headquarters.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The unsolicited comments provided ripe areas for further
research. Any item listed in Appendix B could be researched
and could provide information for program improvement.
F. SUMMARY OF STUDY
The purpose of this study was to determine the most appro-
priate and effective manner in which to provide feedback to
the unit commander from a MCCRES. To this end research was
conducted into the areas of management control and evaluation
theory. Additionally specific research was conducted in the
area of existing systems which measure or evaluate readiness.
The study was approached from a multi-disciplinary back-
ground with a detailed emphasis on the economic question of
how better distribution could be made of the scarce resources
of manpower, equipment, and training time based on the results
of MCCRES. To answer the questions a detailed field study was
conducted in which interviews were completed with 37 Marine
officers of rank from Captain to Colonel who have had involve-
ment with MCCRES as key billet holders. Additionally much of
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the original docxunentation that laid the groundwork for the
development of MCCRES was reviewed along with interviews and
visits with some of the original developers of the system.
The results of the study are displayed as an eight step
feedback model which is based on accepted theory in the fields
of management control and evaluation theory, as well as the
results of the field study. These results are communicated
to the reader as a model in Figure 7.1 which is comprised of
the following elements:
(1) Pre-MCCRES Briefing
(2) Real Time Feedback
(3) Evaluator worksheets
(4) Two-way Debrief at the end of Exercise
(5) Computerized MCCRES Printout
(6) Comparative Percentile Results
(7) Follow-up Report
(8) Trend Analysis
The incorporation of this model as standard MCCRES
feedback procedure will significantly enhance the value of
the results to the evaluated unit and will improve the under-













































































































































































































SUMMARY OF UNSOLICITED COJ^MENTS
Because of the technique employed of encouraging expansion
and discussion on each question, numerous ideas were brought
forth. Although these were not specifically evaluated, they
are of potential importance and should be at least considered
by anyone interested in MCCRES . The comments identified herein
were selected based on their logic and potential impact on
MCCRES . No attempt was made to support or disprove these
remarks; such an analysis is, therefore, left for future
research.
A. PRESENT APPROACH TO MCCRES
Few if any units fail. To several respondents the MCCRES
credibility is in serious doubt because all units seem to
pass with very similar overall scores. As a result of this,
the final MCCRES grade is not very meaningful, especially with
no other grades with which to compare the score. As a result
of this, two of those questioned indicated they saw no value
at all to overall unit grade. Consideration should be given
to doing away with the unit grade and just providing comparative-
trend analysis scores on a generic basis. This would do away
with the informal comparison of scores that now takes place and
provide better support of the intended purpose of not using the




The general feeling among all the respondents is that
MCCRES is a superb opportunity for training with more assets
allocated to the evaluated unit than for most other exericses.
Some suggest a MCCRES should be conducted at both the beginning
and end of a training cycle; to evaluate improvements and to
measure the unit against itself. This would allow evaluators
to be more critical, because the unit would identify strengths
and weaknesses early and adjust training objectives accordingly.
Although it is a costly suggestion, it has potential to further
improve readiness.
C. ANALYZE INDIVIDUALS
The Command needs to know not^ only strengths and weak-
nesses of unit/subunit performance, but the evaluated unit
commander also needs an independent assessment of individual
leadership strengths and weaknesses. Providing MPS's that
require individual evaluation of leaders at all levels would
assist the unit commanders to reinforce his own observations
and to be more aware of where he needs to place emphasis.
D. TACTICAL STERILITY
MCCRES rewards those who follow doctrine explicitly and
avoid innovation. In maneuver warfare innovation and flexibility
are the key to success. Yet MCCRES measures perfoinnance by
comparison with standard doctrine. Problems here arise not
out of the MCCRES procedure, but the fact that much of the
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doctrine upon which MCCRES is based is rapidly being outdated.
To have an effective/believable evaluation, the whole cycle
of doctrine and inclusion of new doctrines in MCCRES must be
maintained. The general thought is MCCRES rewards those who
"play the game" and may punish those who are "ahead of written
doctrine". Some respondents said sufficient strides have been
made to overcome this in certain suits, but others said this
remains a widespread system problem.
E. LEVEL OF APPLICATION
Although Reference 1 states that the Fleet Marine Force
Commanding General is responsible for application of MCCRES,
the authority is delegated to various levels. Some of the
control is held tightly at the division/wing levels; others
delegate the actual evaluation to regiment/group level. These
differing procedures greatly change the standardization of
evaluation and reduce the pool of potential evaluators
.
F. GROUPING AND TIMING FOR EVALUATION
Most every MCCRES has a different grouping of unit types.
For instance some organizations evaluate battalion-landing
team units with the attached artillery, engineers, tanks,
etc., all evaluated using the MCCRES. Others evaluate only
the infantry battalion; while some organizations use the
MCCRES to evaluate artillery as battalions and others do not.
The Marine Corps standard is that each unit be evaluated using
MCCRES every two years, to ensure that all units in fact are
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evaluated. A detailed scheduling system should be incor-
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